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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has found death constitutional as a
punishment for murder. In Gregg v. Georgia,' the Court declared that
capital punishment is not, by its very nature, cruel and unusual in viola-
tion of the eighth amendment.2 The constitutional debate over the use of
the death penalty continues to rage, however, with arguments centering
on whether states are capable of imposing the death penalty in a nonarbi-
trary and nondiscriminatory manner.3
In Gregg, the United States Supreme Court identified the three main
stages in a capital punishment system at which arbitrariness might occur.
The Court recognized that, first, the prosecutor has broad discretion to
seek the death penalty against any given defendant who has committed a
capital crime.4 Second, arbitrariness can occur at the trial and appeal
stage.5 At the trial level, the judge or jury can impose the death sentence
or grant mercy. At the appellate level, the court can affirm or reverse the
death sentence. Third, potential arbitrariness can result from the execu-
tive's unfettered discretion to reprieve anyone sentenced to death.6
This Article focuses on the Georgia capital punishment system. The
conclusions to be drawn from examination of the Georgia experience
have broad application, however, because the Georgia system is typical
of modem American capital punishment schemes. If the Georgia statute
cannot avoid arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of death sentences,
it is difficult to imagine a statute that could effectively perform that task.
In Part I, this Article examines the Gregg Court's assumption that
safeguards built into the trial and appeal phase of a capital case insure
1. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2. Id. at 187. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall find the death penalty a per se violation of
the eighth amendment. Id. at 230-31.
3. The Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) provides the
source for the concern with arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty. In Furman, the
Court invalidated all death penalty statutes as then applied because they were imposed "discrimina-
torily," id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring), "freakishly," id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring),
and upon only a few defendants, who could not be meaningfully distinguished from those who were
spared. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
4. 428 U.S. at 199 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
5. Id.
6. Id.
[Vol. 62:573
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against arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty in Geor-
gia. The Court in Gregg essentially dismissed the problems inherent in
the prosecutor's discretion to charge and the executive's power to grant
clemency. The Article will address the issues surrounding those stages in
Parts II and III.
Each of the three parts of the Article is both empirical and analytical.
Part I examines the eighty-five murder convictions that were decided by
the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1981.' In addition to analyzing the
theoretical limitations of the Georgia death penalty statute, the Article
compares the actual cases of the twenty defendants sentenced to death
with those of the sixty-five defendants given life imprisonment. Part II
reviews statements made by Georgia prosecutors concerning the consid-
erations they took into account when deciding whether to seek a death
sentence. Part II attempts to place the prosecutor's statements in the
context of generally accepted justifications of prosecutorial discretion.
Finally, Part III examines the first five post-Gregg clemency applications
that the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles considered to determine
how the decision to commute a death sentence relates to the rest of the
capital punishment system.
I. TRIAL AND APPEAL
In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld the Georgia statute, proclaiming it
the virtual model of fair and equitable capital punishment legislation.8
According to the Gregg Court, Georgia's revised capital punishment sys-
tem promised to avoid the random infliction of death sentences that the
Supreme Court had held a violation of the eighth amendment in Furman
v. Georgia.9 The Court particularly stressed two improvements in the
Georgia legislation. First, the legislation purportedly controlled the
jury's discretion to impose a death sentence by providing "clear and ob-
jective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application"'" of
the ultimate penalty. Second, the legislation provided that the Supreme
Court of Georgia would conduct mandatory appellate review of all death
sentences, including a proportionality review to determine "whether the
7, The sample used in this Article consists of 20 mandatory reviews of death sentences and 65
appeals from life sentences. See infra Appendix.
8. 428 U.S. at 197-98.
9. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See supra note 3 (discussing the old Georgia statute's constitutional
problems).
10, 428 U.S. at 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)).
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sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant."" The
following two sections address the central questions raised by Georgia's
current capital punishment scheme: (1) whether objective standards can,
and must, truly guide jury discretion to impose the death penalty and
(2) whether appellate review can ensure evenhanded application of the
death penalty.
A. The Illusion of Guided Discretion
In Gregg, the Supreme Court gave strongly worded assurances that the
guidance provided to the jury by the new Georgia statute would result in
fair and rational imposition of the death penalty.' 2 The Court promised
that "clear and objective standards"'13 would channel a jury's decision to
sentence a defendant to death. After ten years' experience with the
"guided discretion" statutes 14 so warmly embraced in Gregg, the Court
seems to have retreated from the requirement that juries must actually be
guided in their sentencing decision. Recently in Zant v. Stephens'- and
Barclay v. Florida,6 the Court affirmed death sentences arrived at by use
of partially unconstitutional 7 and highly subjective'" "standards." The
11. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c) (1983) provides that the Supreme Court of Georgia shall
review all death sentences to determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice,
or any other arbitrary factor;
(2) Whether. . . the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggra-
vating circumstance. . .; and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
12. 428 U.S. at 207-08.
13. Id. at 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)).
14. The Georgia legislature passed its statute, which is prototypical of the "guided discretion"
model, in 1973. Many states adopted this type of statute shortly after the Supreme Court decided
Furman. Many more states copied the basic scheme after the Supreme Court found the mandatory
approach to the death penalty unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
15. 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).
16. 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983).
17. In Stephens, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death after
finding two aggravating circumstances present. One of the aggravating circumstances was that the
defendant had "a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27.2534.1(b)(1) (1973), which the Supreme Court of Georgia subsequently held unconstitutionally
vague in Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 539-42, 224 S.E.2d 386, 390-92 (1976).
18. In Barclay v. Florida, the trial judge overrode a jury's recommendation that Barclay receive
a life sentence, alluding to his personal Army experience during World War II:
I, like so many American Combat Infantry Soldiers, walked the battlefields of Europe and
saw the thousands of dead American and German soldiers and I witnessed the concentra-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss4/2
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Court declared itself satisfied as long as the state's legislature and highest
court have appropriately defined the class of defendants who may be sub-
jected to capital punishment.19 The meaning of the term "guidance"
thus has changed significantly.
Perhaps the Court's shift was inevitable. In McGautha v. California,2"
the Court had declared the task of setting meaningful standards for im-
posing the death penalty "beyond present human ability."21 The Court
affirmed McGautha's death sentence despite the jury's absolute, unfet-
tered discretion to condemn him to die or to let him live. Justice Harlan,
writing for the Court, concluded that the "infinite variety of cases and
facets to each case would make general standards either meaningless
'boiler-plate' or a statement of the obvious that no jury would need." 22
Yet one short year later, in Furman v. Georgia2" the Court made a re-
markable about-face. Citing the absence of standards and the resulting
"freakish" imposition of death sentences on defendants whose crimes
could not be rationally distinguished from the crimes of others whose
lives were spared, the Court invalidated all capital punishment statutes
then in effect.24
tion camps where innocent civilians and children were murdered in a war of racial and
religious extermination....
Having set forth my personal experiences above, it is understandable that I am not easily
shocked or moved by tragedy-but this present murder and call for racial war is especially
shocking and meets every definition of heinous, atrocious and cruel.
103 S. Ct. at 3423 n.6. Counsel for Barclay noted that this judge had made similar references to his
own past in each of the five cases in which he imposed a death sentence. In four of those cases he
overrode a jury's recommendation of life. Brief for Petitioner at 35, 61, Barclay v. Florida, 103 S.
Ct. 3418 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. at 3440 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court found no constitutional infirmity in this subjective approach, stating that rejecting
such personal judgments would transform sentencing into "a rigid and mechanical parsing of statu-
tory aggravating factors." 103 S. Ct. at 3424.
19 Id.; Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742-43 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 189 (1976)).
20, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
21. Id. at 204. The Court stated: "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal
homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and express these characteristics
in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be
tasks which are beyond present human ability." Id.
22. Id. at 208.
23. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
24. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger rightly dismissed as "disingen-
uous" the Court's half-hearted attempt to distinguish McGautha on the basis that the Court decided
McGautha on due process principles, while it decided Furman on eighth amendment grounds. Id. at
399-400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justices Brennan and Marshall maintained that capital punishment is a per se violation of the
eighth amendment, id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In sum, the Court initially found death sentences imposed without
standards constitutional in McGautha because standards to guide a jury
were unworkable. The Court then retracted its blanket approval of death
penalty sentencing discretion a year later in Furman. In Stephens and
Barclay, the Court has once again allowed the execution of defendants
selected without guidance and in violation of the standards created in
response to Furman. The Court's recent affirmance of death sentences in
Stephens and Barclay despite gross deviation from any "clear and objec-
tive standards" signals an implicit recognition that Justice Harlan was
correct when he declared it impossible to define meaningful standards for
imposing the death penalty.
The current Supreme Court would no doubt protest that it has not
retreated to the pre-Furman era of absolute discretion. It has, after all,
insisted that legislatures narrow, to some unspecified extent, the category
of murder punishable by the death penalty.25 In Georgia, the legislature
performed this narrowing function by providing that the judge or jury
must find at least one of ten statutory aggravating circumstances before a
death sentence may be imposed.26 According to the Court, this require-
Douglas, Stewart, and White found an eighth amendment violation in the way in which the states
had applied the death penalty statutes. See supra note 3.
25. The Stephens Court pointed out that the jury must find at least one valid statutory aggra-
vating circumstance before a defendant can receive a death sentence. The aggravating circumstance
"must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder." 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742-43 (1983).
26. The Georgia legislature has defined first degree murder as follows:
(a) A person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either
express or implied, causes the death of another human being.
(b) Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow
creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice
shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears, and where all the cir-
cumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
(c) A person also commits the crime of murder when in the commission of a felony he
causes the death of another human being, irrespective of malice.
(d) A person convicted of murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment of life.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1 101(a-d) (1983).
The Georgia legislature lists the aggravating circumstances that may render a murder punishable
by death as follows:
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge
shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, any
mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law
and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be sup-
ported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a
person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony;
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss4/2
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ment will prevent arbitrary discrimination or freakish application of the
extreme penalty.
The Court is wrong. Neither in theory nor in practice does the Geor-
gia scheme ensure evenhanded imposition of capital punishment. The
theory suffers from several flaws. First, although the "narrowing" ac-
complished by the statutory aggravating circumstances does remove
some "simple" murders from the death penalty category, it still leaves a
broad and varied range of murders as capital crimes. Second, and more
critically, however narrowly the legislature defines the class of murders
for which death is a possible punishment, unless some standards govern
the actual imposition of a death sentence within that class, the imposition
of the penalty will continue to be discriminatory and arbitrary. It is thus
not surprising, although it should be disturbing, that the study of the
Georgia appeals in 1981 demonstrates empirically that no meaningful
way exists to distinguish the few defendants sentenced to death from the
while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony or
aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender
was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree;
(3) The offender, by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping, knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by
means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of
more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or so-
licitor was committed during or because of the exercise of his official duties;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed mur-
der as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim;
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties;
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement; or
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of him-
self or another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by the
evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The
jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by
the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it
found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury cases the judge shall make such
designation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the
statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (b) of this Code section
is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
Id. § 27.2534.1(b) & (c).
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many spared.27
The Georgia requirement that a judge or jury find at least one statu-
tory aggravating circumstance before a death penalty may be imposed
actually excludes very few homicides that would be defined as murder
rather than manslaughter. The ten aggravating circumstances listed are
broad enough to convert virtually any type of murder into a capital
crime. Various characteristics of the offender, circumstances of the
homicide, or attributes of the victim can serve to place the murder into
the death penalty category.
If the defendant previously has been convicted of a capital crime,
which the Georgia Supreme Court has defined to include armed robbery,
rape, kidnapping, and other crimes,28 or if the defendant is in or has
escaped from custody, any murder the defendant commits can result in a
death sentence.29 If the defendant committed a murder during the
course of another capital felony,30 an aggravated battery, burglary, or
arson in the first degree, the murder is punishable by death.3" If the de-
27. The Court in Furman seemed to require that those selected for death be distinguishable, in
some rational, objective way, from those convicted but sentenced to prison terms. Justice Stewart
stated in his concurrence:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning
is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and
1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.
408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); Justice White added in his concurrence:
I can do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the
facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases in-
volving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty. That conclusion, as I have said, is
that the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes
and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not.
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). For a cogent discussion of the difference be-
tween the definition and selection stages, see Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23-
38 (1980).
The McGautha Court also fully recognized the distinction between guiding discretion and narrow-
ing the class of defendants for whom death is a possible punishment: "As we understand these
petitioners' contentions, they seek standards for guiding the sentencing authority's discretion, not a
greater strictness in the definition of the class in which the discretion exists." McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183, 206 n.16 (1971).
28. The Supreme Court of Georgia has construed "capital felony" for purposes of the aggravat-
ing circumstances set forth in section 27-2534.l(b)(2) to include all felonies that were capital crimes
at the time the legislature enacted the death penalty. Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422, 432, 238 S.E.2d 12,
20 (1977).
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(1) and (9) (1983).
30. See supra note 28.
31. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(2) (1983).
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fendant committed a murder to receive money, as an agent for another,
or to avoid or prevent arrest, the homicide is punishable by death.32 Cer-
tain characteristics of the victim will automatically qualify the murderer
for a death sentence. If the defendant kills a present or former judicial
officer or district attorney during or because of the exercise of his official
duties,33 then the defendant qualifies for a death sentence. The defendant
also qualifies for the death penalty if he kills a peace officer, corrections
employee, or fireman while these officials are engaged in the performance
of their official duties.34 Finally, the method the defendant uses to ac-
complish the murder can subject him to the death penalty. If the defend-
ant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a
public place35 or if his murder is outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman because it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim, then he may be sentenced to death.36 The
"'catch-all" aggravating factor found in section (b)(7) of the statute, that
a murder is "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, '3 7 in-
creases the probability that a judge or jury will include all murders
within at least one of the aggravating circumstances.
At least one of these aggravating circumstances occurs in the great
majority of murder cases. Any killing that took place during a robbery is
punishable by death. All multiple killings and any assault in which one
person is injured and another killed can result in death sentences. A
killing that involves kidnapping, defined to include forcing the victim to
walk several yards at gunpoint,38 can be punished by death. Even the
killing of a spouse or other relative can call for the death penalty, if a jury
determines that the murder was "cruel" or "torturous." Thus very few
homicides will fail to meet at least one of the conditions permitting a
death sentence. The two most common situations that usually lack ag-
gravating circumstances are the "ordinary" domestic or lovers' triangle
murders39 and the almost random killings of one victim that appear to
32. Id. § 27-2534.1(b)(4), (6) & (10).
33. Id. § 27-2534.1(b)(5).
34. Id. § 27-2534.1(b)(8).
35. Id. § 27-2534.1(b)(3).
36. Id. § 27-2534.1(b)(7).
37. Id. § 27-2534.1(b)(7). This aggravating circumstance is commonly referred to as "(b)(7)."
38. See, e.g., Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 297, 298 S.E.2d 10, 16 (1982); Waters v. State, 248
Ga. 355, 283 S.E.2d 238, 250 (1981).
39. By far the greatest number of murder convictions appealed during 1981 in which no aggra-
vating circumstances appear to be present involve some form of a domestic killing, killing of a lover,
or killing of a romantic rival. See, e.g., Pennamon v. State, 248 Ga. 611, 284 S.E.2d 403 (1981)
Number 4]
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arise out of arguments, often involving alcohol abuse.4"
Once this rather limited category of cases without aggravating circum-
stances4 is eliminated, a large and diverse group of cases remains for
which the Georgia legislature has decided that death is an appropriate
penalty. In determining whether a member of this group should die in
the electric chair, the jury has absolute, unfettered, and even unguided
discretion just as juries did before the Supreme Court declared such dis-
cretion unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia.42
The broad range of murders included in the capital category makes the
unbridled discretion of juries in deciding whether to sentence a defendant
to death particularly dangerous. But even if the Georgia legislature had
performed its narrowing function more effectively, due process and
eighth amendment concerns of arbitrariness would remain. If the legisla-
ture or the judiciary narrowed the class of capital crimes so as to limit
the possible reach of the death penalty to two people once every ten
years, the Constitution, and justice, would not be satisfied if the state
executed one of the two people based upon the flip of a coin.4a If Georgia
convicted fifty people of murder in 1981, and each case involved at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance, it would be unconstitutional for
the state to execute those twenty who happened to have red hair and
(defendant killed wife during argument about divorce); Daniel v. State, 248 Ga. 271, 282 S.E.2d 314
(1981) (defendant killed ex-wife's boyfriend); Alexander v. State, 247 Ga. 780, 279 S.E.2d 691 (1981)
(defendant killed his mistress's husband); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 571, 277 S.E.2d 53 (1981) (defend-
ant shot wife); Blanchard v. State, 247 Ga. 415, 276 S.E.2d 593 (1981) (defendant killed former
father-in-law); Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411, 276 S.E.2d 590 (1981) (defendant killed wife); Evans v.
State, 247 Ga. 204, 275 S.E.2d 65 (1981) (defendant killed former girlfriend's new male friend);
Jones v. State, 247 Ga. 268, 275 S.E.2d 67 (1981) (defendant killed former wife); Aldridge v. State,
247 Ga. 142, 274 S.E.2d 525 (1981) (defendant killed his wife after an argument). See infra
Appendix.
40. See, e.g., Appleby v. State, 247 Ga. 587, 278 S.E.2d 366 (1981) (defendant killed female
victim after argument at social gathering); Marable v. State, 247 Ga. 509, 277 S.E.2d 52 (1981)
(defendant killed drinking companion); Smith, T. v. State, 247 Ga. 453, 276 S.E.2d 633 (1981) (de-
fendant shot man with whom he had an argument outside a pool hall).
41. As may be apparent, these homicides tend to be borderline murder cases to begin with. An
argument between husband and wife that escalates to a fatal outcome might very well constitute
manslaughter. See, e.g., Raines v. State, 247 Ga. 504, 277 S.E.2d 47 (1981). An inexplicable, mo-
tiveless killing is likely to bring into play an insanity or diminished capacity defense to negate the
required element of malice. See supra note 26.
42. See Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2760-61 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. The New York Commission on Judicial Conduct recently forced a New York City judge to
resign from office for using such a method to decide between a twenty and thirty day jail term, See
In re Friess v. New York State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 91 A.D.2d 554, 457 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1982).
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spare the others.' Similarly, and more realistically, it violates the Con-
stitution to execute black defendants who kill white victims while giving
life terms to white defendants who kill black victims.4 5
The facts of Zant v. Stephens 6 highlight the inappropriateness of pro-
viding standards solely to determine the threshold issue of who is eligible
for the death sentence, rather than providing standards to determine who
actually deserves a death sentence. Stephens has now been executed even
though the judge instructed the jury on an aggravating circumstance that
the Georgia Supreme Court declared invalid.4 7 The judge instructed the
jury that it could consider Stephens' "substantial history of serious as-
saultive criminal convictions" as an aggravating factor.4" The Georgia
Supreme Court found this factor unconstitutionally vague in Arnold v.
State. 9 The judge also instructed the jury on three other aggravating
circumstances: Stephens had been convicted of a capital felony;5° the
murder was outrageously or wantonly vile;5" and the murder was com-
mitted by an escapee. 2 The jury failed to find the murder particularly
vile, but it did find that Stephens was an escapee, that he had a prior
conviction for a capital felony, and that he had a substantial history of
serious assaultive convictions, 53 and sentenced Stephens to die.
If the "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions"
had been the only statutory aggravating circumstance, Stephens' death
sentence could not stand.5 As long as one valid statutory aggravating
circumstance was present, however, the jury was free to impose a life or
death sentence without giving any specific reason for its decision. It is,
therefore, clear that what caused the jury to decide on a death sentence is
44. I am indebted to Professor Stephen L. Nathanson, Department of Philosophy, Northeast-
ern University, for this analogy.
45. Recent studies have found that killers of white victims in Georgia are more than eight times
as likely to receive a death sentence as killers of black victims. N.Y. Times, January 5, 1984, at A18
col. 3. See also Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Stat-
utes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty:
The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981).
46. 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).
47. See supra note 17.
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2737.
49. 236 Ga. 534, 539-42, 224 S.E.2d 386, 391-92 (1976).
50. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(1) (1983).
51 See id. § 27-2534.1(b)(7).
52. See id. § 27-2534.1(b)(9).
53. 103 S. Ct. at 2737 n.3.
54. See Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976) ("substantial history of serious
assaultive criminal convictions" held unconstitutionally vague); supra note 17.
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purely a matter of speculation." The jury thus might well have decided
that Stephens should die based on his prior record of assaultive behavior,
rather than because he was a convicted capital felon or because he was an
escapee. The United States Supreme Court, in affirming Stephens' sen-
tence, has thus declared that it is constitutionally acceptable for Stephens
to die, despite the fact that the jury may have imposed the death sentence
solely because of his prior record, a factor the Georgia Supreme Court
found unconstitutionally vague. Although a substantial history of as-
saultive behavior cannot serve as the basis for placing someone in the
death penalty category, someone in that category can actually suffer the
death penalty, imposed by a jury that considered the impermissible ag-
gravating factor, simply because it is possible that the jury relied on per-
missible aggravating factors.
Serious prior assault convictions might, if more precisely defined, be
the type of circumstance that could reasonably lead a jury to decide that
the defendant "deserved" to die more than some other murderers. The
same is not true of the defendant's race, the victim's race, the political
affiliation of the defendant, or the defendant's history of mental illness.5 6
Yet any of these factors could persuade a jury, in its unreviewable discre-
tion, to decide to sentence a defendant to death. That decision appar-
ently is acceptable to the Supreme Court, as long as a legitimate statutory
aggravating circumstance is also present. If the condemned person fits
into one of the categories eligible for capital punishment, any reason, or
no reason, can serve to place him on death row. It does not matter
whether the jury chooses to execute him because he was black, or poor,
or psychotic. Although those are not valid reasons to make him eligible
for the extreme penalty, they apparently are sufficient reasons to make
him actually suffer the penalty.57
55. In Georgia, unlike in some other states, the jury is not instructed to weigh aggravating
against mitigating circumstances in arriving at its sentence. 103 S. Ct. at 2741.
56. Justice Stevens emphasized the distinction between an aggravating circumstance held inva-
lid because unduly vague and one which would authorize a jury to discriminate based on race,
political expression, or religion, or to consider as aggravating a factor that a jury should see as
mitigating, such as mental illness. 103 S. Ct. at 2747.
57. Even if all murderers who are eligible for a death sentence in some sense "deserve" to die,
those defendants actually chosen to be executed should be so chosen because they deserve to die, and
not because they were politically unpopular, for example. If juries may exercise their discretion,
once they have found an aggravating circumstance, in keeping with their prejudices, then juries put
defendants on death row not because they deserve to die, but because they have the misfortune of
belonging to the wrong race, political group, or religious denomination. Again I express my grati-
tude to Professor Nathanson for this insight. See supra note 44.
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If this result is unjust, then it is imperative that standards governing
the imposition of the death penalty apply to more than the definitional
stage of capital crimes. It is not enough that the defendants for whom
death is a possible punishment all have certain characteristics in com-
mon; those actually selected to die must be distinguishable in some objec-
tive and meaningful way from those who are spared. This Article's study
of the eighty-five appeals of murder convictions that the Georgia
Supreme Court decided during 1981 reveals no such objective and mea-
surable difference between the twenty defendants sentenced to death and
the sixty-five who, despite the presence of aggravating circumstances in
most cases, received life sentences.5" Neither detailed and specific com-
parisons of cases involving similar facts nor broader comparisons of ag-
gravating circumstance categories, such as murders during robberies or
murders of policemen, explains why some defendants received the ulti-
mate penalty while others received life sentences.
1. Case Comparisons
In 1981 the Georgia Supreme Court decided all of the following cases.
I invite the reader to predict which of the defendants were sentenced to
life in prison and which were sentenced to death.
Murder by Poison: Vaughn and Tyler
Junior and Helen Vaughn, husband and wife, were convicted of the
malice murder of their employer, Ray Oglesby. The Vaughns killed
Oglesby by adding arsenic to his beer.59 The Vaughns lived on Oglesby's
farm and were purchasing their house from him when they fell behind in
their payments. In Mr. Vaughn's confession, he stated that he killed
Oglesby in the belief (which was mistaken) that he would own the house
58. While it is not always possible to determine with certainty which aggravating circumstances
were present in the case, the court's opinion on appeal generally provides sufficient information to
show that the case involved one or more aggravating factors. Thirty-one cases involved another
capital felony, burglary or arson. Twelve cases involved aggravated battery on more than one vic-
tim. Five cases involved murders committed for the purpose of receiving money. Twenty-four
murders qualified as "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that [they] involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." Finally, two murders involved
police or correction officers. Several cases involved more than one aggravating factor. See infra
Appendix.
59. The facts are taken from the opinions in Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479
(1981) and Vaughn v. State, 248 Ga. 127, 281 S.E.2d 594 (1981).
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free and clear upon Oglesby's death. Oglesby suffered a painful and pro-
tracted death; he died forty hours after ingesting the poison.
Shirley Tyler was convicted of murdering her husband by putting
parathion, a form of rat poison, in his chili and beans.6" In her confes-
sion, Mrs. Tyler asserted that she had killed him to prevent him from
hurting her child. The state presented evidence that poisoning may have
caused Mr. Tyler's two previous illnesses. The actual motive for the
murder was unclear. The prosecution introduced evidence that Mrs.
Tyler was the beneficiary of a $15,000 life insurance policy through her
husband's job, but Mrs. Tyler testified that she was unaware of this pol-
icy before Mr. Tyler's death and the jury refused to find that Shirley
Tyler committed the murder for pecuniary gain. Mr. Tyler also suffered
a long, painful death.
Junior and Helen Vaughn received life sentences, while Shirley Tyler
received the death penalty. The jury in the Tyler case found that the
murder involved "inhuman torture."6 The prosecution did not seek the
death penalty against Helen Vaughn. It did seek the death penalty
against Junior Vaughn, but the jury recommended a life sentence.62
Murder During Robbery: Cervi and Wilson; Bordon and Cole
Dr. Kenneth Lawrence picked up two hitchhikers, Michael Cervi and
Robert Wilson, who were shipmates on unauthorized leave from the
Navy.63 The three traveled together from Columbia, South Carolina, to
Augusta, Georgia, at which point Cervi took a rifle out of his seabag and
ordered the doctor off the interstate. Cervi and Wilson took $1,000 from
Lawrence and forced him into a wooded area. They tied him to a tree
with his necktie, and Wilson hit Lawrence in the head with the rifle butt
several times. Holding the rifle, Wilson ordered Cervi to kill the doctor,
60. The facts are taken from the opinion in Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 274 S.E.2d 549, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981), supplemented by a review of the trial transcript.
61. Id. at 124, 274 S.E.2d at 554. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected appellant's claim
that those two words were insufficient to satisfy the requirement that the murder be "outrageously
vile, wanton or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to
the victim." Id.
62. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed Junior Vaughn's first conviction on the ground that
the police had obtained his written confession in violation of his sixth amendment rights. Vaughn v.
State, 247 Ga. 127, 281 S.E.2d 594 (1981). At the second trial the jury convicted him again and
sentenced him to life in prison. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Vaughn v. State,
249 Ga. 803, 294 S.E.2d 504 (1982).
63. The facts are taken from the opinion in Cervi v. State, 248 Ga. 325, 282 S.E.2d 629 (1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938 (1982).
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whereupon Cervi slashed Lawrence's throat. Wilson and Cervi fled in
Lawrence's car, but Lawrence managed to free himself and get to the
road to seek help. He died the next day due to injuries to his head and
neck.
Marvin Borden and Ellis Cole, Jr., together with two others, robbed a
grocery store.64 Borden hit the manager with his fist, knocked him to the
floor, and kicked him in the face several times. After taking the store's
money, Borden and Cole decided to kill the manager so he could not
identify them. Borden stabbed the victim three to six times in the back,
and Cole slashed his throat. He died from extensive loss of blood.
Of the four defendants, only Cervi was sentenced to death. The
Supreme Court of Georgia justified Cervi's sentence, in light of the prison
sentence imposed on the codefendant Wilson, by noting that Cervi had
slashed the victim's throat while Wilson had only hit him in the head
with the rifle butt: "[T]he cutting of a human's throat illustrates an abso-
lute intent to take life . . ."" The court did not have to distinguish
Cole's sentence from Cervi's sentence, because the prosecutor in the Cole
case did not seek the death penalty. The court did mention that Cervi's
murder was not a "domestic murder" ;66 apparently such murders call for
a lesser sentence, except for Shirley Tyler.
Murder by Fright: Dupree and Blankenship
Wade Berry Hampton was a 71-year-old double amputee confined to a
wheelchair.6" One night, Silas Dupree and an accomplice entered Hamp-
ton's house, which he shared with 70-year-old Essie Mae Hamilton. Ms.
Hamilton heard the masked men demand money from Hampton. After
the robbers left, she found Hampton lying dead next to his overturned
wheelchair with his broken crutch nearby. He had suffered a head injury
and a deep cut to his finger. An autopsy revealed the cause of death to be
heart failure resulting from the stress and injuries sustained during the
robbery.
Roy Blankenship had been drinking in a bar until the early morning
hours.6" He decided to break into the apartment of a 78-year-old woman
64. The facts are taken from the opinion in Borden v. State, 247 Ga. 325, 277 S.E.2d 9 (1981).
65. Cervi v. State, 248 Ga. 325, 333, 282 S.E.2d 629, 637 (1981).
66. Id. at 332, 282 S.E.2d at 636.
67. The facts are taken from the opinion in Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 277 S.E.2d 18 (1981).
68. The facts are taken from the opinion in Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590, 277 S.E.2d 505
(1981).
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for whom he had done repair work. He struggled with her until she
became unconscious; he then placed her on the bed and raped her.
Blankenship also inserted a plastic bottle into her vagina. Forensic evi-
dence showed that she died of heart failure brought on by the trauma.
Both Dupree and Blankenship were convicted of felony murder. The
prosecution did not seek the death penalty for Dupree. The jury sen-
tenced Blankenship to die.69
Murder of a "Friend" for Money: Myron and Cunningham
James Myron, using an assumed name, made friendly overtures to two
wealthy sisters who often wore very expensive jewelry.7" He lured one of
the elderly women to an apartment, where he killed her by stuffing an
ether-soaked handkerchief into her mouth. The other sister found the
body on the bathroom floor, stripped of all jewelry except for one ring.
She had been wearing several valuable necklaces, bracelets, and rings
shortly before her murder. A jewelry expert testified that Myron had
called him a few days before the murder to ask whether he would want to
buy several hundred thousand dollars worth of jewelry for $100,000.
Shortly after the murder, Myron visited the jeweler and received $10,000.
James Cunningham tried unsuccessfully to secure a loan.7' He then
went to the home of a man who had previously given him and his family
food. With the intent to rob him, Cunningham hit the victim on the
head and arms with a large wrench. He took the money from the vic-
tim's wallet, and left him lying on the floor.
State psychiatrists found Cunningham mentally competent both times
they examined him. The jury sentenced James Cunningham to death.72
The prosecutor did not seek the death penalty against James Myron.
69. The court vacated Blankenship's death sentence because the trial judge had improperly
excluded a prospective juror in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Blanken-
ship v. State, 247 Ga. 590, 593-94, 277 S.E.2d 505, 511 (1981). At the retrial the jury again sen-
tenced Blankenship to death. The Georgia Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing,
however, because the trial court excluded certain evidence from the sentencing phase. Blankenship
v. State, 251 Ga. 621, 308 S.E.2d 369 (1983).
70. The facts are taken from the opinion in Myron v. State, 248 Ga. 120, 281 S.E.2d 600 (1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1154 (1982).
71. The facts are taken from the opinion in Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558, 284 S.E.2d 390
(1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982).
72. Id. at 560, 284 S.E.2d at 394. Death Row, U.S.A., published by the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, Inc., June 20, 1983, gives James Cunningham's race as black. Id. at 9.
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2. Category Comparisons
In addition to selecting cases from the 1981 sample with similar fact
patterns for a more detailed comparison, the author placed all the cases
into broader categories and then tried to determine whether the defend-
ants sentenced to death within each category could be distinguished from
those given life sentences. No pattern emerged.73 For example, of seven-
teen defendants convicted of killing their victim during a robbery, five
were sentenced to die74 and twelve were not.75  While some of these
death sentences were imposed in cases involving particularly heinous cir-
cumstances, 76 some murders that resulted in life sentences appear at least
73. The limited nature of the available sample hampered the author's and the Supreme Court of
Georgia's inquiry, see infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. The author considered appealed life
sentences. According to the most recent study, 30% of murder convictions are not appealed. Un-
published data gathered by David Baldus, University of Iowa College of Law, Iowa City, Iowa
52242, Whether these convictions involved comparable fact situations to the appealed cases is a
matter of speculation. It seems plausible to suppose, however, that the killings might be more hei-
nous, leading the defendant to believe he had very little chance of success on appeal. If this assump-
tion is correct, the death sentences would be even harder to distinguish from these nonappealed cases
than they were from this study.
A much larger number of cases not included is the negotiated guilty pleas in return for life
sentences, which are virtually never appealed. Georgia resolves approximately 52% of all its murder
indictments by guilty pleas. Baldus data, supra. Here again, reliable information on such cases is
difficult to obtain. The prosecutor has virtually unlimited discretion to enter into such negotiations;
the factors affecting his decision no doubt vary considerably. See infra notes 164-220 and accompa-
nying text.
74. See Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558, 284 S.E.2d 390 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038
(1982); Thomas v. State, 248 Ga. 247, 282 S.E.2d 316 (1981) (sentence reversed and remanded
because of improper questioning); Cervi v. State, 248 Ga. 325, 282 S.E.2d 629 (1981); Justus v. State,
247 Ga. 276, 276 S.E.2d 242 (1981); Hardy v. State, 247 Ga. 235, 275 S.E.2d 319 (1981).
75. See Odom v. State, 248 Ga. 434, 283 S.E.2d 885 (1981); Ellis v. State, 248 Ga. 414, 283
S.E2d 870 (1981); Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981); Myron v. State, 248 Ga. 120,
281 S.E.2d 600 (1981); Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 277 S.E.2d 18 (1981); Lyons v. State, 247 Ga.
465, 277 S.E.2d 244 (1981); Fortner v. State, 248 Ga. 107, 281 S.E.2d 533 (1981) (two codefendants:
McCluskey and Riley); Rachel v. State, 247 Ga. 130, 274 S.E.2d 475 (1981) (two codefendants:
Robinson and Wright). In addition, Robert Wayne Wilson, the codefendant of Mr. Cervi, received a
life sentence. Mr. Cervi was sentenced to death. See Cervi v. State, 248 Ga. 325, 333, 282 S.E.2d
629, 637 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938 (1982). Similarly, Dean Goins, codefendant of Mr. Jus-
tus, was sentenced to life imprisonment. See Goins v. State, 245 Ga. 62, 262 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
These last two cases are not included in this Article's sample because they were not decided by the
Georgia Supreme Court in 1981.
76. In Hardy v. State, 247 Ga. 235, 275 S.E.2d 319 (1981), the evidence showed that the de-
fendant beat and undressed the victim, who was known to have a large amount of cash, to find the
money. The defendant then cut the victim, poured gasoline on him, and finally shot the victim to
death. The defendant burned the body to hide the crime. In Justus v. State, 247 Ga. 276, 276 S.E.2d
242 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981), the defendant kidnapped, raped, and stabbed the
victim before he killed her by a shot to the head. In Cervi v. State, 248 Ga. 325, 282 S.E.2d 629
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equally gruesome. 77 Similarly, among twelve defendants found guilty of
murder during the course of a store robbery, the four defendants placed
on death row seem no more deserving of death, by any rational and ob-
jective measure, than the eight who received sentences of life imprison-
ment.78 In cases in which the victims were law enforcement officers, no
consistent sentencing pattern emerged. Two defendants who killed po-
lice officers were sentenced to death,7 9 while a defendant who killed a
police chief and one who killed a prison guard were given life sentences.8 0
The murder of a peace officer,8 1 a statutory aggravating circumstance,
was present in all four cases. No meaningful distinguishing features ap-
(1981), the defendant beat the victim with a rifle and cut the victim's throat after having tied the
victim to a tree. He died the next day.
77. In Ellis v. State, 248 Ga. 414, 283 S.E.2d 870 (1981), the defendant strangled and bludg-
eoned the victim, who was 104 years old and confined to a wheelchair, to death. The state did not
seek the death penalty. In Fortner v. State, 248 Ga. 107, 281 S.E.2d 533 (1981), three defendants
robbed a man at gunpoint and, after he handed over his wallet, shot him in the stomach. The victim
died several hours later. The three were sentenced to life imprisonment. Finally, Wilson, the code-
fendant in Cervi v. State, 248 Ga. 325, 282 S.E.2d 629 (1981), participated in the beating of the
victim and, while he held the rifle, ordered Cervi to kill the victim. Yet Wilson received a life
sentence.
78. Death sentences were imposed in Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 530 (1981) and
Brown v. State, 247 Ga. 298, 275 S.E.2d 52 (1981) (two codefendants: High and Ruffin). The de-
fendants in the following cases were sentenced to life in prison: Borden v. State, 247 Ga. 477, 277
S.E.2d 9 (1981) (codefendant Cole); Walker v. State, 247 Ga. 746, 280 S.E.2d 333 (1981); Kelley v.
State, 248 Ga. 133, 281 S.E.2d 589 (codefendant pled guilty); Berry v. State, 240 Ga. 430, 283 S.E.2d
888. In Borden v. State, 247 Ga. 477, 277 S.E.2d 9 (1981), the defendant knocked the victim, a
grocery store manager, to the floor and kicked him in the face five times. One defendant stabbed the
victim three to six times and the other defendant slashed his throat. He died of extensive bleeding.
The defendants decided to kill the victim after taking the store's money, so that he could not identify
them. Id. at 477, 277 S.E.2d at 10.
79. In Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698, 278 S.E.2d 398 (1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3551 (1983),
the defendant was sentenced to death for shooting a police officer who stopped him pursuant to a
burglary investigation. The defendant sped off after the killing and the police later captured him
after a gun battle. No one was hurt in this second episode. Id. at 699, 278 S.E.2d at 401. In Wallace
v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 282 S.E.2d 325 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927 (1982), the defendant shot
two officers, one fatally with the officer's gun, while being booked for driving while intoxicated.
Despite evidence that his blood alcohol content was .11% and that he suffered from schizophrenia,
the defendant was sentenced to death. Id. at 255-57, 282 S.E.2d at 328-29.
80. In Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981), the jury imposed a life sentence
despite a finding of four aggravating circumstances. Id. at 33, 276 S.E.2d at 229. The defendant was
convicted of murder and mutiny in a penal institution as a result of his participation in a riot at the
Georgia State Prison in which two inmates and a guard were killed and another guard was seriously
injured. Witnesses identified Jordan as the prisoner who stabbed the two guards. Id. at 329, 276
S.E.2d at 227-28. In Foster v. State, 248 Ga. 409, 283 S.E.2d 873 (1981), the defendant received a
life sentence upon his conviction for murdering the Chief of Police of Swainsboro, Georgia. Foster
shot the Chief of Police when the officer tried to disarm him. Id. at 409, 283 S.E.2d at 874.
81. Actually three aggravating circumstances relate to peace and corrections officers:
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pear in the opinions to justify the disparate sentencing. s2
The results of these comparisons are perhaps to be anticipated, given
that the decision to sentence a defendant to death is still left largely to the
whim of the jury, unchanneled by any ascertainable guidelines.83 After
examining the 1981 cases, it is clear that Georgia's death row population
is no more fairly selected now than the one held "freakishly" chosen in
Furman.84
B. The Charade of Appellate Review
In addition to its reliance on guided jury discretion, the United States
Supreme Court has continued to emphasize that the provision for pro-
portionality review contained in the Georgia death penalty scheme helps
to ensure against arbitrary and capricious results." The Gregg Court
viewed Georgia's statutory provision requiring the state's highest court
to determine whether each sentence of death "is excessive or disporpor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant,"86 as an important safeguard against errant ju-
ries. The Court's confidence, however, was misplaced. Justice Rehn-
quist's doubts that "a process of comparing the facts of one case in which
a death sentence was imposed with the facts of another in which such a
(b)(8). The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections em-
ployee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties;
(b)(9). The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement;
(b)(10). The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or
another.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(8)-(10) (1983).
82 The Georgia courts' lack of consistency in applying the death penalty is all the more dis-
turbing because a mandatory appellate review of a death sentence is likely to portray the facts as
darkly as possible to justify its approval of the death sentence. See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 133 (2d ed. 1981).
83 See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
84. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
85. See Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2749 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203
(1976). The Stephens Court recently stressed the importance of appellate review when it affirmed a
death sentence despite the jury's finding of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance:
Our decision in this case depends in part on the existence of an important procedural
safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each death sentence by the Georgia Supreme
Court to avoid arbitrariness and to assure porportionality . . . . As we noted in Gregg,
•. I we have . . . been assured that a death sentence will be vacated if it is excessive or
substantially disproportionate to the penalties that have been imposed under similar
circumstances.
103 S. Ct. at 2749-50.
86. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c)(3) (1983).
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sentence was imposed [would] afford any meaningful protection against
whatever arbitrariness results from jury discretion"87 have proven accu-
rate. The Court's approval of death sentences despite the Georgia
Supreme Court's perfunctory review foreshadowed the recent acknowl-
edgement in Pulley v. Harris88 that the eighth amendment does not re-
quire state courts to engage in proportionality review.
The limitations inherent in the Georgia Supreme Court's examination
of death cases may further obstruct meaningful appellate review. Almost
uniformly,89 appellate proportionality reviews cite only to those cases
that also resulted in a death sentence and that were in some sense "simi-
lar" to the case on appeal.90 If the court considers any similar cases in
which a life sentence was imposed,91 it does not list or discuss such cases
in its opinions.92 Even assuming that the court actually does look at
87. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 316 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984). In Harris, the Court stated that there was "no basis" in any previous
case for holding that the eighth amendment required proportionality review. Id. at 879. Justice
White, writing for the Court, admitted that in Gregg six Justices had "made much of" the Georgia
proportionality review requirement. Id. at 877. He concluded, however, that the Gregg Court had
regarded proportionality review as merely an "additional" safeguard and had not included it among
"the components of an adequate capital sentencing scheme." Id.
89. In Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983), the court did cite to some life
sentences imposed on defendants hired to commit murder. Id. at 792 n.12, 301 S.E.2d at 250 n.12.
It then proceeded to list in the appendix murders for hire in which death sentences were imposed,
and affirmed appellant's death sentence.
90. In all the 1981 cases reviewed for this Article, the court invariably listed in its appendix
only other death sentence cases. The similarity of the listed cases with the case before the court was
often superficial and at times rather strained, if not actually misleading. For example, in Tyler v.
State, 247 Ga. 119, 274 S.E.2d 549, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981), the court cited to six "similar"
domestic murder cases. Furman rendered unconstitutional the statute under which the death pen-
alty in the first three cases was imposed. Morgan v. State, 231 Ga. 280, 201 S.E.2d 468 (1973);
Sirmans v. State, 229 Ga. 743, 194 S.E.2d 476 (1972); Jackson v. State, 229 Ga. 191, 190 S.E.2d 530
(1972), vacated, Jackson v. Georgia, 409 U.S. 1122 (1973), conformed, 230 Ga. 181, 195 S.E.2d 921
(1973). Two of the other "similar" cases involved the killing of a spouse or former spouse for the
purpose of obtaining insurance proceeds, a motive that Tyler's jury had specifically refused to ascribe
to her. Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496, 246 S.E.2d 642 (1978); Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 222
S.E.2d 308 (1976). In the sixth comparison case, the defendant had strangled, slashed, and cut his
former wife before finally killing her by stabbing her through the heart. Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209,
232 S.E.2d 47 (1977).
91. Curtis French, Special Assistant to the Supreme Court of Georgia in charge of the staff
authorized to collect cases for the similarity review, see GA. CODE ANN. § 2537(0-(h) (1983), stated
in a June, 1982, telephone interview that the Georgia Supreme Court considers life sentence cases in
death penalty proportionality reviews. He noted, however, that preference is given to cases in which
the state unsuccessfully sought the death penalty. Because there are relatively few of these cases the
court uses for comparison cases in which the state could have charged the defendant with capital
murder.
92. Unpublished life-sentence cases used in the similarity review raise many of the problems
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some cases in which the defendants received life sentences, its review is
severely limited by the fact that only appealed life sentences are available
for comparison.93 Thus the Georgia Supreme Court does not have access
to the records of the thirty percent94 of murder convictions resulting in a
life sentence. Moreover, few if any defendants appeal a life sentence
when they have received the sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.
95
Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court rarely reviews any cases in
which the prosecutor agreed to forego the death penalty in return for a
that are encountered in "limited publication" circuits, without entailing any of the savings of judicial
resources. (In a limited publication circuit, certain cases, deemed insignificant in terms of law-mak-
ing, are not published.) First, courts may be less than meticulous if their reasoning is not open to
public scrutiny; this is particularly harmful in capital cases. This assessment may seem harsh, but
the Georgia Supreme Court often disposes of proportionality reviews with the statement "a compari-
son of cases shows this sentence is not disproportionate." See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
Second, the failure to publish life sentence cases makes scholarly evaluation of court review of
Georgia death penalty cases difficult. This is particularly disturbing because the constitutionality of
capital punishment rests on "evolving standards of decency." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (emphasis added). Courts must publish their life sentence opinions before this evolving stan-
dard in charging, sentencing, and appellate review becomes visible. The Georgia Supreme Court's
failure to disclose which cases it uses for comparison effectively obscures developing trends. Schol-
ars could collect the Georgia life sentence cases and evaluate trends themselves, but this would be an
enormous duplication of effort and still leave the reviewing process of the court unclear. Finally,
even if the court's assessment in any given similarity review is meticulous and accurate, nonpublica-
tion shrouds the process of comparison and hence damages the appearance ofjustice. See Reynolds
& Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1978) (discussing arguments supporting
and opposing limited publication).
93. Confirmed by Curtis French, see supra note 91. While Justice White was correct when he
asserted that the relevant Georgia statute does not condone the use of only appealed cases, Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 223 n. 11 (1976) (White, J., concurring), the Georgia court admits in its own
opinions that it only considers cases appealed to that court. See, ag., Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga.
558, 565, 284 S.E.2d 390, 397 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982). Such a limitation is obvi-
ously convenient-indeed obtaining information on unappeaed cases would no doubt be difficult.
Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court in the very case cited by Justice White refused to examine life
sentences noted by the defendant. It stated that "this court is not required to determine that less
than a death sentence was never imposed in a case with some similar characteristics." Moore v.
State, 233 Ga. 861, 863-64, 213 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1975), cert denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
Petitioners in Gregg and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), a companion case, raised the
argument that proportionality review based only on appealed capital convictions is inadequate. The
Court disposed of this contention summarily, without discussion or citation to authority, saying
essentially: "we disagree." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 n.56 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 259 n.16 (1976).
94. Baldus, supra note 73.
95. The author has found no such appeal. But see Ford v. State, 248 Ga. 241, 282 S.E.2d 208
(1981) (appeal from a denial of habeas corpus on the grounds that joint representation of two code-
fendants had been improper; codefendants had pleaded guilty in exchange for consecutive life
sentences).
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guilty plea. 96
Because the Georgia Supreme Court examines a very select group of
murder convictions, its proportionality review is severely flawed. With
only a skewed sample before it, the court cannot possibly perform the
self-assigned task of ensuring "that no death sentence is affirmed unless
in similar cases throughout the state the death penalty has been imposed
generally."97 At best, Georgia's proportionality review may insure that if
a court imposes a death sentence in a case which is in no way similar to
other death penalty cases, the supreme court may vacate the sentence.
Because, however, the categories of aggravating circumstances are virtu-
ally all-inclusive,98 that situation has never arisen.
An examination of the Georgia Supreme Court's decisions in which it
has conducted the statutorily required proportionality review supports
the conclusion that its review fails to ensure against arbitrariness. Over
the past ten years, the court has set aside as disproportionate only two
death sentences for murder. In one case, the defendant had received a
life sentence for the same killing at a previous trial.99 In the other case, a
96. See infra notes 164-220 and accompanying text.
97. Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 864, 213 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910
(1976).
98. See the excellent discussion in Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68
GEO. L.J. 97, 111-17 (1980). Professor Dix concluded:
In its attempt to categorize cases and examine the extent to which cases in each category
have resulted in death penalties, the court has used extremely broad categories that permit
almost any killing to fit within at least one category. Killings of witnesses and victims
during robberies can be subsumed in the general category of killings related in any fashion
to the commission of a serious felony. If the killing was for monetary gain, death is permis-
sible; if not, an "execution style" killing is sufficient for imposing death. That a killing was
related to a domestic dispute is irrelevant if the case can be brought within one of the
statutory categories. Thus, almost any killing for which a prosecutor might reasonably
seek the death penalty can be placed within an "approved" category and thereby immu-
nized from reversal.
Id. at 115.
99. Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205, 236 S.E.2d 365 (1977). The state actually tried the defendant
three times. At the first trial, the jury recommended a life sentence but the appellate court reversed
the conviction because of an erroneous alibi charge. The second trial ended in a mistrial when the
jury was unable to agree upon a verdict. After the third trial the jury imposed a death sentence,
finding that the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile . . ." under (b)(7). The court found
that the life sentence imposed in the first trial rendered the later death sentence disproportionate. Id.
at 208, 236 S.E.2d at 368. Three justices dissented, and would have affirmed the death sentence,
relying partly on Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), which had approved a death sentence
imposed after an original life sentence. Id. at 209, 236 S.E.2d at 369. Stroud has since been ex-
pressly held inapplicable to a death sentence imposed in a bifurcated proceeding, such as the one
Georgia incorporated in its capital sentencing statute. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446
(1981).
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death sentence had been imposed on the nontriggerman in a felony-mur-
der when the triggerman had only been given a life sentence."m The
court's reaction to these highly unusual cases, which involved a built-in
comparison of the death penalty with a life sentence imposed under
nearly identical circumstances,'01 does not foster confidence that propor-
tionality review provides meaningful protection against arbitrariness and
discrimination.
The court's opinions in the 1981 death penalty cases demonstrate the
perfunctory way in which it conducts proportionality review. The opin-
ions almost invariably end with the boilerplate language:
Reviewing the death penalty in this case, we have considered the cases ap-
pealed to this court since January 1, 1970, in which a death or a life sen-
tence was imposed. We find that the following similar cases listed in the
appendix support the affirmance of the death penalty. The appellant's sen-
tence to death for murder is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.'0 2
When the court does elaborate, it is frequently to argue why it should
affirm the death sentence even though the murder fell into a category
that usually resulted in a life sentence."0 3 Such a justification of a death
sentence, despite more common imposition of life sentences in similar
cases, surely defeats any hope that proportionality review will serve the
purpose for which it was designed. If the court concedes, for example,
that "lesser sentences than death are frequently imposed in domestic
murder cases,"" it cannot be true in any meaningful sense that
100. Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252, 244 S.E.2d 833 (1978). During a liquor store robbery in which
Hall and Smith participated, Smith fired a shot that killed the store clerk. Both defendants had prior
robbery convictions. The court, citing to Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205, 236 S.E.2d 365 (1977), found
Hall's death sentence disproportionate in view of Smith's sentence to life imprisonment at a subse-
quent trial. 241 Ga. at 257, 244 S.E.2d at 838. Once again, three justices dissented and would have
affirmed the death sentence. Id. at 260, 244 S.E.2d at 839 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
101. The Supreme Court of Georgia would have vacated the death sentences in Hall and Ward
under subsequent Supreme Court decisions that do not address proportionality concerns. Under the
rule established in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), the state could not have sought a
death sentence in Ward's second and third trials. See supra note 99. The Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) probably would invalidate Hall's death sentence.
In Enmund, the Supreme Court held that death is an excessive sentence for one who did not take
life, attempt to take life, or intend to take life. See supra note 100.
102. Messer v. State, 247 Ga. 316, 325, 276 S.E.2d 15, 24, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981).
103. See, e.g., Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 624, 284 S.E.2d 422, 430 (1981), cert. denied, 456
U S. 919 (1982); Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 837, 279 S.E.2d 650, 673 (1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 984 (1982); Justus v. State, 247 Ga. 276, 279, 276 S.E.2d 242, 245-46, cert denied, 454 U.S. 882
(1981).
104. Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 125, 274 S.E.2d 549, 555, cert denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981).
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"throughout the state the death penalty has been imposed generally" '
in domestic murder cases.
Instead of reviewing all similar murder cases to determine whether a
particular defendant merits a death sentence, the court appears to see its
task as justifying whatever death sentences juries impose, no matter how
inconsistent or irrational. The court's ingenuity in finding ways to de-
clare a sentence "proportionate" is at times severely tested. Perhaps
Cervi v. State10 6 provides the most telling example of this phenomenon
among the 1981 cases. In Cervi, described above, the court affirmed the
defendant's death sentence in spite of the fact that his codefendant, Rob-
ert Wilson, had been sentenced to life in prison.
The court began its review of Cervi's sentence by stating that no iron-
clad rule requires that one defendant may not receive a death sentence if
the codefendant was sentenced to life. 107 The court then tried to distin-
guish the degree of culpability attached to the different acts of the two
defendants: Wilson smashed the victim's head with a rifle butt, while
Cervi cut the victim's throat. The court ignored the fact that the victim
died as a result of the combination of these injuries. Moreover, Wilson,
while holding the rifle, ordered Cervi to kill the victim. The court found
a more definite intent to kill in cutting a man's throat than in bashing his
head. It declined to find comparable culpability in Wilson for ordering
the killing, because Wilson, according to the evidence, did not actually
point the rifle at his accomplice. Finally, the court noted that the gun
originally belonged to Cervi.
If the decision were whether to add a year or two to Cervi's prison
sentence because of his perceived higher degree of involvement, the re-
view might be acceptable. But because the question is quite literally a
matter of life and death, such minute parsings of actions and states of
mind fail to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing the sentences.
Georgia's mandatory appellate review of death sentences has thus
proven far from effective in assuring evenhanded application of the death
penalty. At most, Georgia courts succeed in weeding out the extreme
case in which the death sentence should not have been imposed in the
first place. At worst, the court approves death sentences when a life sen-
105. Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 864, 213 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910
(1976).
106. 248 Ga. 325, 282 S.E.2d 629 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938 (1982). See supra notes 63-
66 and accompanying text.
107. Id. at 333, 282 S.E.2d at 637.
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tence for the same defendants would have been equally reasonable. Cer-
tainly the court's decisions do not provide the promised assurance that
excessive or disproportionate sentences will be vacated upon careful and
thorough review of sentences imposed in similar cases.'
C. Old Problems: The Fallibility of the System and Imperfections of
the Process
Although guided jury discretion and appellate review are critical pro-
cedural checks in recent eighth amendment analysis, older concerns
about capital punishment persist. Both proponents and opponents of the
death penalty recognize the irreparable injustice of executing an innocent
person."° Moreover, the procedures leading to a death sentence, while
perhaps sufficient to ensure equitable imposition of less serious penalties,
are unequal to the awesome responsibility of taking a person's life.
1. Mistake
Jerry Banks' ordeal started November 7, 1974.110 While hunting in
Henry County, Georgia, Banks found blood stains in the road. His dog
led him into the woods, where he found two dead bodies. He went to the
road and flagged down a motorist, who called the police. Approximately
a month later, the state charged Jerry Banks with both murders.
At the first trial1 1' a detective from the sheriff's office testified that he
received a call on November 7, 1974, at 5:45 p.m. from an unidentified
male who said that a young black male carrying a shotgun flagged him
down on the road and told him to call the police. The detective stated
under oath that he did not know the identity of the caller.
The detective went to the location that the caller gave him. Jerry
Banks was waiting there and led the detective to the bodies, explaining
108. Cf supra note 85.
109. Professor Black calls this kind of mistake a "mistake-in-fact," or executing someone in
error. There are other and more common forms of mistake. See infra notes 130-35 and accompany-
ing text. See generally C. BLACK, supra note 82, at 22-30, 85-93.
110. Banks v. State, 235 Ga. 121, 218 S.E.2d 851 (1975) (reversing conviction and death sen-
tence and remanding on the basis of newly discovered evidence); Banks v. State, 237 Ga. 325, 227
S.E 2d 380 (affirming conviction and death sentence given in the second trial), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
975 (1976); Banks v. Glass, 242 Ga. 518, 250 S.E.2d 431 (affirming denial of habeas corpus relief),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 986 (1979); Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 1, 268 S.E.2d 630 (1980) (reversing the
conviction and death sentence given in Banks' second trial on the basis of newly discovered evi-
dence). After the last reversal the prosecutor entered a nolleprosequi and the charges were dropped.
11. Unless otherwise noted and until text accompanying note 117, all facts are taken from the
opinion rendered in Banks' first appeal. Banks v. State, 235 Ga. 121, 218 S.E.2d 851 (1975).
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how he had found them. The police began a search of the area that eve-
ning and continued it for two hours; apparently no one found any shot-
gun shells that evening.
The following morning, November 8, the police asked Banks to turn
over his gun' 1 2 for testing. Sometime that day shotgun shells were found
at the crime scene. That same day the police fired test rounds with
Banks' gun." 3 The State Crime Lab determined that the shell casings
found at the crime scene came from Banks' gun. When questioned on
December 5, Banks said he had not fired the gun in that area. At the
trial, however, Banks' brother testified that he had been hunting and had
fired the same shotgun in that area about a week before Banks found the
bodies.
An autopsy of the two victims showed that they were each shot twice
in the back at approximately 2:30 p.m. on November 7. One of Banks'
neighbors testified that Banks had been at her home from about 9:30 a.m.
until about 5:00 p.m. on November 7.
The shotgun casings constituted the strongest evidence against Banks.
The unavailability of the motorist-caller also damaged Banks' defense: it
left his story uncorroborated and could have given the impression that
Banks had invented the caller to confuse the police. The jury convicted
Banks and sentenced him to death on January 31, 1975.114
After the conviction, the mysterious "motorist-caller" was found. As
112. The gun was actually owned by his brother. Id. at 123, 218 S.E.2d at 853.
113. Newspaper reports allege that experts fired the test rounds at the murder site and that the
shells found on the 8th were left after the test. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1980, at 31 col. 1. An assistant
district attorney for the circuit in which Banks was tried pointed out, however, that the allegations
have never been proven and noted that it is nearly impossible to determine where a person was on a
given day, five or six years later. (telephone conversation with Mr. Floyd, Asst. District Attorney
for Flint Circuit, June, 1982). If test shots were fired at the murder site on the 8th, it would explain
why shells were found on the afternoon of the November 8 but not, even after extensive searching,
on November 7, after Banks discovered the bodies.
114. The jury found Banks' offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1983). In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the United States Supreme
Court vacated a death sentence based on a similarly unconstitutionally broad and vague reading of
(b)(7). Id. at 428-33. It is interesting that the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Banks' second
conviction, Banks v. State, 237 Ga. 325, 227 S.E.2d 380 (1976), and Godfrey's conviction, Godfrey
v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979), despite the Supreme Court's warning in Gregg: "It is,
of course, arguable that any murder involves depravity of mind or an aggravated battery. But this
language [(b)(7)] need not be construed in this way, and there is no reason to assume that the
Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction." Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 201 (1976).
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a result, Banks' attorney filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial
court denied. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed and remanded the
case for a new trial. What remains a mystery is how the caller was ever
"lost." In an affidavit submitted in support of Banks' motion for a new
trial, the motorist, Mr. Eberhardt, corroborated Banks' statement to the
police and further stated that he had given his name to the police when
he called. Further, Mr. Eberhardt stated that he had called the police
and identified himself prior to the preliminary hearing and grand jury
presentation. The police told him they would notify him if he was
needed. Mr. Eberhardt also stated that after the trial he went to both the
presiding judge and the sheriff, who took a statement from him. In re-
versing the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial, the Supreme
Court of Georgia noted that at the trial all the investigating officers, in-
cluding the sheriff, denied having any knowledge of the identity of the
caller. The court further stated that the testimony of Eberhardt "would
tend to establish the fact, though contradicted, that the sheriff and other
investigating officers knew of his identity all along and that such informa-
tion was either intentionally or inadvertently kept from the defendant
and his counsel." ' 1 5
At the second trial, Banks' attorney, who has since been disbarred,
called Mr. Eberhardt as a witness.I 6 IHe failed, however, to call Banks'
brother, his neighbor, or Banks himself.' 7 The jury again convicted
Banks and sentenced him to death.
After this second death sentence, Banks' two new attorneys, although
working on a long cold trail, discovered an extraordinary amount of new
evidence." II The new attorneys found witnesses to testify that a rapid fire
rifle killed the victims, not a gun like Banks'." 9 The attorneys gathered
115. Banks v. State, 235 Ga. 121, 124, 218 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1975).
1 lb. Banks v. State, 237 Ga. 325, 227 S.E.2d 380 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977).
117. Mr. Myers, Banks' attorney for his first and second trials, also failed to object to the intro-
duction of certain of Banks' statements on the ground that Banks made them involuntarily or that
the police elicited them without forewarning Banks of his constitutional rights. Banks v. Glass, 242
Ga 518, 519, 250 S.E.2d 431, 432 (1978). Furthermore, Mr. Myers failed to challenge the array of
grand and traverse jurors on the ground that the state systematically excluded blacks, young people,
and 'omen. Id. at 520, 250 S.E.2d at 433. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the
convicton and sentence, Banks v. State, 237 Ga. 518, 227 S.E.2d 380 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
975 (1977), and affirmed the denial of a writ of habeas corpus, Banks v. Glass, 242 Ga. 518, 250
S.E.2d 431 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 986 (1979).
118. Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 1, 268
S.E 2d 630 (1980).
1 9. Id. at 2, 268 S.E.2d at 631. Four people in a house near the murder site heard several rapid
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evidence of other suspects 120 and rifle shells' 2 ' present at the scene of the
crime.
The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's denial of a
new trial based on this evidence and stated that "there is so much new
evidence that real doubt is created that Banks had heretofore received a
fair trial."'' 2 2  On remand, the district attorney's office entered a nolle
prosequi123 and on December 22, 1981, the state dismissed all charges
against Jerry Banks.
2 4
The difficulties encountered in uncovering the mistake in Jerry Banks'
case strongly suggest that his plight is not unique.'25 Indeed, it was not.
fire shots at about 2:30 p.m. on November 7, 1974. They reported this to a detective the next day.
The detective wrote up a report, which was lost. Banks' single-shot shotgun was not an automatic
and, therefore, could not have fired the shots heard by the people in the house. A farmer also heard
the rapid fire shots in the area. The farmer, passing near the murder site a few minutes later, saw a
white man holding what looked like a Browning automatic shotgun. The farmer called the sheriff
the next day. The sheriff did not recall the phone call. Two other witnesses, both policemen, recal-
led hearing rapid fire shots and stated that they called the sheriff's department. The sheriff's office
did not remember this call either.
120. Another man, at about noon on November 7, 1974, saw two white men and a woman in a
car like the victims' about a half-mile from the murder site. He testified that the two men were
arguing. The witness went to the sheriff's office, and an officer made a memo of his statement. Id.
121. The mayor and Chief of Police of Stockbridge visited the site of the murder two days after
the killing and found two green shotgun shells in the area. They turned the shells over to the sher-
iff's office, which eventually lost the shells. Green shotgun shells are characteristic of a particular
brand of shotgun ammunition that could not be used in Banks' gun. Id. at 2-3, 268 S.E.2d at 631.
122. Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 1, 268 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1980).
123. A nolleprosequi is a formal entry on the record by the district attorney that the defendant
will no longer be prosecuted on a particular charge.
124. There is not, however, a happy ending to this story. While Jerry Banks was waiting on
death row, his wife filed for divorce and custody of their three children. On March 29, 1982, Jerry
Banks shot and wounded his wife and then killed himself. Lifelines, a newsletter of the National
Coalition Against the Death Penalty, quoted Murphy Davis of the Southern Prison Ministry, who
had visited Banks and worked for his release: "It was something set into motion-a very powerful
death machine-that just couldn't be stopped. You take six years of a person's life you tell them
they are going to die. You tell his wife and kids that you set a tragedy in motion. At the end of six
years you don't go back and say it was all a mistake. . ." Lifelines, Spring 1981, at 12, col. 3 (copies
can be obtained from NCADP, 132 West 43rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10036).
125. Several factors combine to make discovery of mistake difficult. Law enforcement officials
are satisfied that the case is closed once a court enters a verdict. Investigators are faced with loss of
physical evidence and lapsing memories of witnesses. Furthermore, once someone has been executed
for a crime it becomes more difficult to discover a mistake because the potential damage to reputa-
tions, embarrassment, and guilt or shame of the officials involved tend to discourage investigation.
In addition, the interest and help of outsiders is less likely to be a factor after an execution, because
the goal of freeing an innocent person can no longer be achieved. See H. BEDAu, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 234-41 (3d ed. 1982); Pollack, The Errors of Justice, in CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT, 207 (T. Sellin ed. 1967).
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Earl Patrick Charles spent three and one-half years in a Georgia jail
under sentence of death before the district attorney's office accepted his
alibi and released him.'26 Charles was convicted and sentenced to die for
the murders of the owners of a Savannah furniture store during an armed
robbery. He presented evidence through several witnesses that he was
working in Tampa, Florida, 360 miles away, at the time of the killings.
Only at the insistence of defense counsel did the district attorney's office
later reinvestigate and verify the alibi through a Florida police officer.127
These murders occurred about a month before the murders for which
Banks stood trial. The mistake in Charles' case demonstrates that Banks'
experience was not isolated. In Georgia, during a very short time span,
two men who were in fact entirely innocent were convicted of murder
and sentenced to death.'
28
Thus, imposing a death sentence on an innocent person may not be as
rare an occurrence as is commonly believed. The old concern about exe-
cuting an innocent person remains real and inescapable. 129 This concern
is magnified when the category of mistake is expanded from the "wrong
man" to what Professor Amsterdam has described as "wrong mens" er-
rors.'30 The "wrong mens" errors occur in those cases in which the jury
has attributed to the defendant a state of mind, required by the statutory
definition of capital murder, that he did not in fact have. In this highly
complex area of psychological facts, which includes the controversial def-
initions and varying applications of the insanity defense, Professor Black
126 Charles was arrested in Florida in November, 1974, and convicted and sentenced to death
in May, 1975. He remained in custody until July 5, 1978. John Charles Boger, Esq., Legal Defense
Fund, 99 Hudson Street, New York, N.Y. 10013, supplied information about Mr. Charles' case.
The records consist of motions for a new trial with supporting affidavits, the district attorney's state-
ment of intent to place the case on the dead docket with supporting investigative reports, and con-
temporary news accounts. All these materials are on file with the author.
127 All witnesses who testified at trial, including Charles' employer at the Tampa gas station
where he worked the day of the murders, were black. The policeman, who helped the gas station
manager by checking up on new employees such as Charles, were white.
128. See also infra note 159 (discussing the case of Jack House, the first person sentenced to die
under Georgia's new statute, who may represent another case of mistake).
129. Hugo Adam Bedau identified 74 cases in which persons were wrongfully accused of homi-
cide. In 71 cases the defendants were convicted. H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
436-52 (1964). In eight cases an innocent person was executed. Id. at 438. Together with Professor
Michael L. Radelet, Department of Sociology, University of Florida, Mr. Bedau has since uncovered
evidence that at least 300 other cases involved innocent persons convicted of homicide. (Letter to
author from Mr. Radelet, March 2, 1984).
130. Amsterdam, Capital Punishment in H. BEDAU, supra note 125, at 350; Letter to author
(Feb. 27, 1984).
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is surely right in saying that a jury may easily make a mistake.1 3 ,
"Mistakes of law" widen the category of mistake even further. Courts
and legislatures continually alter the definitions of capital crimes, 132 the
meaning of "cruel and unusual punishment,"' 133 and the scope of proce-
dural rights. These changes can affect the fact-finding process and, if
given retroactive effect, the changes may render an execution that has
already taken place a "mistake." 134 Several recent executions would un-
doubtedly fit in this category of mistake. 135
The possibility exists, therefore, of executing an innocent person, a
person who did not have the requisite intent, or a person whom the jury
would not have convicted or sentenced to die but for improper applica-
tion of the Constitution or other relevant statutes. Such mistaken execu-
tions are all the more disturbing now when the primary justification13 6
for the death penalty is its retributive, rather than its deterrent, 137
131. See C. BLACK, supra note 82, at 57.
132. The most dramatic example is the crime of rape. In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977),
the Supreme Court held that death is an unconstitutional punishment for rape. This holding benefits
future defendants and those who had been able to stay in the appellate process long enough to be still
alive when the Court rendered Coker. It does nothing for the 455 men executed for rape from 1930
to 1964. 405 of these men were black. U.S. Dep't of Justice, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 582 (1982).
133. "Simple" homicide, without any aggravating circumstances, seems no longer to suffice to
support a death sentence. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Nor can the state execute a
person for a felony murder unless that person personally "took life, attempted to take life, [or]
intended to take life." Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982).
134. Professor Amsterdam cites two examples that affect numerous cases. First, death sentences
imposed before the decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), in which the Court held
that to exclude from capital juries all veniremen with conscientious objections to capital punishment
violated due process; second, death sentences imposed after trials in which the judge instructed juries
that the defendant has the burden of proving provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. The
Court found that this instruction violated due process in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)
See Amsterdam, Capital Punishment, in H. BEDAU, supra note 125, at 350.
135. The clearest case is that of John Evans. Alabama executed Evans in 1983 upon a convic-
tion under a death penalty statute that the Eleventh Circuit later held unconstitutional in the case
against his codefendant. See Ritter v. Smith, 726 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1984).
136. The Supreme Court has acknowledged two goals as sufficient justification for capital pun-
ishment: deterrence and retribution. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976). Because the
evidence does not support the notion that the death penalty deters more effectively than life impris-
onment, retribution must be the primary goal of the death penalty. Id. at 184-85. See infra note 138.
137. Retribution is the moral goal of giving a criminal his "just deserts." Most modern retribu-
tive theories have their roots in the writings of Emmanuel Kant, a 19th century German philoso-
pher. "Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another
good, either with regard to the criminal or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only
because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime." Kant, Justice and Punish-
ment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 103 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972). For a good
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value.'13  Society's willingness to justify executing some of its members
solely because they "deserve" this most extreme, irreversible penalty is
severely undermined by the reality that "[m]istakes will be made
,"139
2. Due Process
Unlike Jerry Banks, who had no involvement with the murder that
kept him on death row for six years, David Peek may in fact have partici-
pated in the violent brawl that resulted in the death of his brother and
summary of modern retributive theory, see Ellis, Constitutional Law: The Death Penalty: A Critique
of the Philosophical Bases Held to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment Requirements for its Justification,
34 OKLA. L. REV. 567 (1981).
138. Deterrence is the principal utilitarian goal of capital punishment:
The immediate principal end of punishment is to control action. This action is either that
of the offender, or of others: .. . [T]hat of others it can influence no otherwise than by its
influence over their wills; in which case it is said to operate in the way of example ....
Example is the most important end of all ....
Bentham, Punishment and Utility, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 64 (J. Murphy ed. 1973).
Execution clearly incapacitates a criminal. Deterrence of others, however, is much more questiona-
ble. As the Supreme Court concluded: "Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death
penalty as a deterrent. . . simply have been inconclusive." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-85
(1976).
Many have argued that, as an additional utilitarian goal, capital punishment prevents people from
taking the law into their own hands: "When people begin to believe that organized society is unwill-
ing or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown
the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
183 (1976). Justices Brennan and Marshall are right, however, in asserting that no evidence sup-
ports this conclusion, id. at 238 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 303
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). A comparison of lynching statistics with execution statistics belies
the argument that capital punishment prevents vigilantism. Increased executions correlate with
more lynchings, not fewer. W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 40 (1974). Studies finding that
executions have a brutalizing effect also support the notion that executions, particularly publicized
ones, would increase lynching. Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What Is the Effect of
Executions, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453, 458-9 (1980).
Another utilitarian argument that supports the death penalty is that it is cheaper to execute people
than to provide lifetime imprisonment. See Myers, The Death Penalty, 6 CRIM. JUST. REV. 48, 49
(1981) (noted but not espoused). Even if this argument were theoretically viable, it now appears that
the expenses of capital trials and appeals are in fact greater than the cost of imprisoning such defend-
ants for life. Nakell, The Cost of the Death Penalty 14 CRiM. L. BULL. 69 (1978).
139. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226 (1976) (White, J., concurring). Justices White, Burger,
and Rehnquist rather cavalierly dismissed the concern about possible mistakes:
Petitioner has argued in effect that no matter how effective the death penalty may be as a
punishment, government, created and run as it is by humans, is inevitably incompetent to
administer it. This cannot be accepted as a proposition of constitutional law. Imposition
of the death penalty is an awesome responsibility for any system of justice and those who
participate in it. Mistakes will be made and discrimination will occur which will be difficult
to explain.
Id. at 226 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Washington University Open Scholarship
604 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 62:573
cousin. Peek's case is disturbing for a different reason: whether or not
Peek was factually guilty of homicide,1 40 whether or not he had the
mental state required for a murder conviction,1 41 and whether or not
mitigating circumstances existed that would militate against a capital
sentence in his case, 42 the judicial procedures that culminated in his
death sentence were so hurriedly and carelessly carried out that, even if
in some sense he "deserved" to die, a society committed to due process of
law should not administer the death penalty.
Peek's trial for two counts of murder and one count of kidnapping
began less than three days after his indictment. His appointed attorney
waived the requirement of three days' notice before arraignment, citing
"grumblings of the Traverse [petit] Jury that it would be detrimental for
me not to go on trial on this."' 43 On the morning of July 28, 1976, the
parties selected a jury and two alternates. The court delivered prelimi-
nary instructions, including a promise to "move [the case] along as
quickly as we can. '' 44 Counsel presented all the evidence in the case,
140. Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422, 238 S.E.2d 12 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978). The
court's summary of the evidence is incomplete, and the following facts are taken from the trial
transcript, which can be obtained from the author. At his trial, Peek testified that Paul Ward, his
sister's boyfriend, committed the murders (T. 188-190). Numerals preceded by "T" refer to pages of
the trial transcript.)
141. When the prosecutor first questioned Peek, he admitted to hitting the victims in self de-
fense, saying that the victims had beaten Peek up earlier in the day and threatened him again that
night (T. 109). One of the victims, Peek's brother, had a bad reputation in the community (Trial
judge questionnaire, Question 20). If the victims' serious provocation caused Peek to kill them, he
would be guilty, under Georgia law, of voluntary manslaughter. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1102 (1983).
Voluntary manslaughter carries a penalty of from one to twenty years' imprisonment. Id.
142. The Supreme Court in Gregg applauded Georgia's requirement that the jury consider miti-
gating circumstances. The Court gave the following examples of mitigating circumstances: the
defendant's youth, the extent of his cooperation with the police, and his emotional state at the time
of the crime. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197-98 (1976). Peek was only 19 years old at the time
of the offenses. He was sent to Central State Hospital for psychiatric evaluation immediately after
his arrest (Psychiatric report). The main prosecution witness, 15-year-old Pearlie Mae Lawrence,
stated that Peek and the victims spent the evening at a club that served alcoholic beverages. (T. 41-
42.) Thus, both age and mental condition may well have been the mitigating factors, in addition to
the family aspect of the case. Moreover, Peek arranged to alert the police of the crime.
143. Transcript of hearing on motions, July 27, 1976, p. 23. The court countered:
THE COURT: Well, now, that statement bothers me a little bit. What are you talking
about the rumbling of the Traverse Jury? I don't want you to be forced into trial by any-
thing if you can freely and voluntarily make the decision and consent to waive the three
days yourself,--
Id.
144. T. 26. The court hastened to add:
So, we're hoping that we can move this case along, we do not want in any sense for the
Defendant's sake to look like this case is being pushed or being sped up for any reason. All
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consisting of nine witnesses for the prosecution and Peek's testimony in
his own behalf, between noon and 8:30 p.m. that same day, with two
hour-long breaks for lunch and dinner.45
The court reporter did not transcribe the opening statements and clos-
ing arguments of counsel because Georgia law does not require transcrip-
tion unless the defendant can afford to pay for it.'4 6 The stenographer
noted, however, that the jury heard summations at the guilt phase be-
tween 8:35 and 9:10 p.m. that evening.147 The jurors heard the court's
charge on the law from 9:20 to 10:27 p.m., and then retired to deliber-
ate.'4 8 At midnight, the court inquired about their progress and gave
them the option to stay overnight. The foreman asked for fifteen more
minutes. At 12:35 a.m., the foreman entered the courtroom to report
that one of the jurors was "nervous" and wished to be excused.' 49 Both
I want us to do is to not just unusually waste time, but we will move it along as quickly as
we can and certainly we'll excuse you as soon as we can.
Id.
145. T. 68, 183-84, 213.
146. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 6-805 & 27-2401 (1983). The Supreme Court of Georgia has re-
fused to hold that the failure to transcribe argument of counsel in a capital case is reversible error,
despite its acknowledgement that the court "should" transcribe closing arguments in a death case.
Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 247 S.E.2d 92, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978). The same court
has on several occasions set aside death sentences because of improper arguments by the prosecutor
(where the transcript happened to be available), even when the trial counsel did not object. See, e.g.,
Hawes v State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977); Prevatte v. State, 233 Ga. 929, 214 S.E.2d 365
(1975). Moreover, mandatory death sentence review requires the Supreme Court of Georgia to de-
termine whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor, GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c) (1983), a task that would appear impossible without
reviewing the arguments of the prosecutor at the penalty phase.
147. T. 213.
148. Id. at 213, 230.
149. The entire colloquy was recorded as follows:
THE COURT: All right. Let the record show that the Foreman has come out and indi-
cated that Mr. Chester Geesling, he feels, is definitely extremely nervous and almost at the
breaking point and that they have been trying to do what they could to placate him and to
keep something from happening and that Mr. Geesling has requested that he would like to
be excused and Mr. Briley, I believe, you said that you will stipulate-
MR. BRILEY: The State will stipulate that he may be excused.
MR. ASHLEY (defense counsel): Under the circumstances, the Defense will stipulate
that he may be excused.
THE COURT: All right, sir.
MR. BRILEY: Let's substitute the first alternate, is that-
THE COURT: Well, I think we ought to have the Foreman to advise the, after Mr.
Geesling leaves, to advise the panel that we are not going to just, you know, start excusing
at random, because, but I think they are all aware as I understand it from what you say of
the situation-
MR. FOREMAN: Everybody else is just fine, but I mean, it is just that fellow.
THE COURT: Yes, sir. Okay. Well, we'll then, let him go. Let him come on out then.
MR. FOREMAN: You just want me to tell him he can leave?
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counsel agreed, without any inquiry of the juror himself and without ob-
taining the defendant's personal consent, to allowing the juror to
leave. 150 The court substituted the first alternate1 5 for this juror at 12:42
a.m. Precisely three minutes later the newly constituted jury returned
with its verdict finding Peek guilty on all three counts.15 2
Immediately after the finding of guilt, at 12:45 in the morning, the
court proceeded to the sentencing phase. Neither side presented any evi-
dence in aggravation or mitigation. Again, the court reporter did not
transcribe the prosecuting attorney's argument to the jury in favor of the
death penalty, which the jury heard from 12:55 to 1:15 a.m. The re-
porter did not transcribe the defense counsel's ten minute speech,
either. 53 The charge of the court consisted largely of reading the rele-
vant statutes. The court gave a detailed explanation only of the single
statutory aggravating circumstance that the state submitted, which was
that the defendant committed each capital felony in the course of another
capital felony. The court did not mention any possibly mitigating
factors. '54
The jury retired at 1:45 a.m. to deliberate on whether the defendant
should live or die. The jury returned at 2:07 a.m. with a finding that the
state had proven the aggravating circumstances and recommended that
THE COURT: Yes, sir. •
MR. FOREMAN: Because he doesn't want to make a big to do about it.
THE COURT: Right. Well, I haven't got a back door for him to go out. Mr. Weinstein?
MR. WEINSTEIN: Yes sir.
MR. FOREMAN: Can I just tell him the gist of what we've been talking about?
THE COURT: All right. We have just excused a Juror by agreement of both Counsel
and by the Court on word that has come out of the Jury Room here, so we need to ask you
to go in and take his place, please sir.
MR. WEINSTEIN: All right, sir.
Id. at 231-32.
150. Id. at 231.
151. The court had not sequestered this juror with the other jurors, as required by Georgia law
in capital cases, GA. CODE ANN. § 59-718-1 (1983). The court permitted this juror to go home for
his meals, "due to his diet" (T. 68), and he was absent from the courtroom during testimony for
some unspecified period. T. 176.
152. T. 232-33.
153. Id. at 234.
154. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has recently reaffirmed that
"jury instructions must 'describe the nature and function of mitigating circumstances' and 'commu-
nicate to the jury that the law recognizes the existence of facts or circumstances which, though not
justifying or excusing the offense, may properly be considered in determining whether to impose the
death sentence.'" Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1503 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Spivey v. Zant,
661 F.2d 464, 472 (11th Cir. 1981)).
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the court sentence the defendant to death. 55 During the 22 minutes in
which the jurors made their decision to impose the death penalty, they
first had to decide whether the state had proven the statutory aggravating
circumstance that the defendant committed each murder during the
course of another capital felony. As to each murder, the jury had to
decide whether the defendant committed it during a kidnapping or an-
other murder; the jury's muddled conclusions on these matters15 6 give
some indication of the less than clear analysis that took place at 2 a.m.1 57
The proceedings that led to Peek's death sentence are not unusual.
The practice of holding the penalty phase immediately after the finding
of guilt appears to be the norm, rather than the exception, even when the
jury reaches that verdict late in the evening. 158
155. T. 241-42.
156. The sequence of events as described by the prosecution witness, Pearlie Mae Lawrence,
began with Peek killing his brother Grady in an argument over Ms. Lawrence, who was his brother's
15-year-old girlfriend. Peek then allegedly raped Pearlie Mae in Grady's car. When Peek's cousin,
James Jones, came out of the house, Peek killed him as well. Then he drove the two bodies and Ms.
Lawrence (whom he had placed in the trunk) a short distance and left to report the events to the
police. Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422, 426, 238 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1977); T. 42-5 1. The jury found that
Peek committed the kidnapping of Pearlie Mae (also considered a capital crime) while he was en-
gaged in committing murder. The jury also found that Peek committed the murder of James Jones
while he was engaged in the kidnapping, and finally, that Peek murdered Grady while he was en-
gaged in committing the murder of James Jones. T. 272.
157. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Peek's conviction and death sentence on direct
appeal Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422, 238 S.E.2d 12 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978). Peek's
application for a state writ of habeas corpus was denied, after a hearing during which the excused
juror, whose name was Greeson, not Geesling, testified that he felt compelled to leave the delibera-
tions because he was the only juror voting for acquittal. Peek v. Kemp, 746 F.2d 672 (1lth Cir.
1984). A federal district court also denied relief, id. at 676, but the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit recently reversed Peek's conviction and sentence, finding the substitution of the alter-
nate improper. Id. at 683.
A very similar substitution of a juror during capital sentencing deliberations was upheld a few
months earlier by a different panel of the Eleventh Circuit in Green v. Zant, 738 F.2d 1529 (1 lth Cir.
1984). Judge Vance, who wrote the opinion for the court in Green and dissented in Peek, certainly
saw no distinguishing features between the two cases. Peek v. Kemp, 746 F.2d 672, 695 (Vance, J.,
dissenting and concurring in part). In addition to showing a lack of adherence to due process in
capital cases, this pair of decisions demonstrates graphically yet another way in which a death sen-
tencing decision may be arrived at arbitrarily. Depending on which judges are sitting on a given day,
the defendant will live or die. Roosevelt Green was executed on January 9, 1985 after the Supreme
Court tied four to four and refused to grant a stay. 53 U.S.L.W. 3482 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1985); see also
N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1985 at A17, col. 1.
158. See. e.g., Finney v. State, 242 Ga. 582, 250 S.E.2d 388 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 916
(1979), Legare v. State, 243 Ga. 744, 257 S.E.2d 247, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979). In Finney
the sentencing hearing began at 10 p.m. and continued until after midnight on a Friday evening,
after two long days of trial. During the trial the prosecution introduced the victim's skull into
evidence, causing one of the jurors to become physically ill (Transcript of trial, p. 523). The Elev-
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Furthermore, the fairness of proceedings that lead to death sentences
often is fatally undermined by defense attorneys who do not possess the
experience or ability to investigate possible defenses,' 59 make viable at-
tacks on the prosecution's case,1 60 or present mitigating evidence in the
penalty phase.16' In addition, prosecutors who frequently cross the
enth Circuit reversed Finney's death sentence on the grounds that the jury had been inadequately
charged on mitigating circumstances. The appellate court appeared to frown on the hurried pro-
ceedings. Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643, 647 (11th Cir. 1983). In Legare, the jury arrived at the
death sentence on Thanksgiving night at 1 a.m. Conversation with Patsy Morris, ACLU of Georgia,
January, 1984. The United States Supreme Court vacated Legare's death sentence for a murder he
committed when he was 17 in light of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Legare v. Zant,
455 U.S. 914 (1982). On remand, Legare was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of
Georgia vacated that sentence because the court gave the jury an erroneous Allen charge. (An "Al-
len charge," derived from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), urges those in the minority in
the jury room carefully to reconsider the reasonableness of their vote). Legare v. State, 250 Ga. 875,
302 S.E.2d 351 (1983). Legare has recently again been sentenced to death after a third sentencing
proceeding. Conversation with George Kendall, ACLU of Georgia, December, 1984.
159. Jack Carlton House was convicted in July, 1973 of the sodomy and murder of two seven-
year-old boys. An attorney who had never read the new Georgia capital punishment statute under
which House was tried represented House at trial. The attorney never spoke to any prosecution
witnesses, never visited the scene of the crimes, learned for the first time from the witness stand that
a blood stain on House's pants would be used in evidence, left the courtroom during the direct
testimony of a police officer whom he then proceeded to cross-examine, and became aware of the
provision for a separate sentencing stage only when he was in the middle of the sentencing stage.
House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 612-13 (11th Cir. 1984). The attorney failed to find out that the
blood stain on House's pants was the same blood type as House's wife's, who was menstruating on
the day House was arrested. Id. at 614. When two neighbors came forward after the trial to state
that they saw the two boys alive hours after House had supposedly killed them and at a time when
House was at home in bed, the attorney failed to bring this information to the attention of the court
in his boilerplate motion for a new trial. Id. at 613. The testimony of the two neighbors, presented
in a later hearing on House's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, caused a federal magistrate to
announce: "[T]his is probably the only case that I have had in twelve or fourteen years of being in
the criminal justice system when I really thought the convicted accused was innocent of his crime."
House v. Balkcom, No. C78-1471A, p. 21, transcript of proceedings before Hon. J. Owens Forrester,
U.S. Magistrate, July 27, 1981. Despite this assessment, the district court reversed only the death
sentence. House v. Balkcom, 562 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Ga. 1983). The circuit court reversed the
conviction on the ground that defense counsel's "level of representation was far below acceptable
levels at all phases of the case." House v. Balkeom, 725 F.2d 608 (11 th Cir. 1984).
160. Charlie Young's attorney, like House's, was unaware of Georgia's bifurcated procedure in
capital cases. Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792 (11th Cir. 1982). In a case that presented extremely
weak evidence of a premeditated murder, the attorney failed to put the prosecution to its proof.
Instead, the attorney argued at the guilt-innocence phase that the jury should extend mercy to
Young. Id. at 797. Even though the testimony indicated that the killing had occurred at the end of
a heated argument and struggle between Young and the victim, the lawyer never argued that Young
might be guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. Id.
161. Having conceded at trial that Young was guilty of malice murder, his attorney failed to
present any of the available mitigating evidence to the jury at the penalty phase. The jury thus never
learned that Young, college-educated and articulate, had not been in any prior trouble with the law
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bounds of fairness and propriety by giving inflammatory closing argu-
ments undermine the jury's ability to consider the imposition of the
death penalty objectively. 6 z Thus, defendants regularly receive death
sentences after proceedings marred in one way or another, dramatic or
more subtle, that render the decision an affront to any concept of due
process of law. In fact, between 1976 and 1983, federal courts of appeal
decided seventy percent of the capital cases in which a district court had
denied a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioners on the federal con-
stitutional claims.
163
The new Georgia capital punishment statute thus has neither resulted
in significantly less arbitrary imposition of death sentences nor solved the
problems of mistake and defective procedures. These problems are in-
herent in any criminal justice system, but they create much more serious
concerns in the death penalty context. The trial and appeal stage of a
capital case still presents ample opportunity for the injection of caprice
and discrimination into the decision whether a given defendant will live
or die. The remainder of this Article demonstrates that Georgia's capital
punishment process vests even more uncontrolled discretion in prosecu-
tors and in the clemency authority.
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
The petitioners in Gregg argued that no matter how guided the sen-
tencing discretion might be at trial, 4 or how carefully an appellate court
reviews the sentence,165 arbitrariness in the imposition of the death pen-
alty would persist because prosecutors possess unfettered discretion to
and had a favorable employment recommendation from the Sheriff of Greene County, where the
killing took place. Id. The lawyer also failed to challenge the state's proof of the aggravating cir-
cumstances that Young committed the killing during an armed robbery and for pecuniary gain,
despite what a district court later found to be undisputed evidence that Young formed no intent to
rob the victim before his death. Id. at 794. In reversing Young's conviction, the court of appeals
held that his attorney "did not accord Young even a modicum of professional assistance at any
time." Id. at 794-95.
162 See, e.g., Tucker v. Zant, 724 F.2d 882 (1lth Cir. 1984); Brooks v. Francis, 716 F.2d 780
(1 th Cir. 1983), reh'g granted. 728 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir. 1984); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940 (11th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3544 (1983).
163 Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3405 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). This percentage
demonstrates the extent to which death sentence proceedings diverge from basic due process
requirements.
164. But see supra notes 12-84 and accompanying text (discussing failure to create effective gui-
dance for jury discretion).
165. But see supra notes 85-108 and accompanying text (discussing problems with appellate re-
view under Georgia's death penalty scheme).
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decide whether to seek a death sentence against any given capital of-
fender. 1 6 The Supreme Court dismissed this claim. Some Justices re-
jected petitioners' argument that Furman prohibited total discretion in
all decisions, not just the sentencing decision, in capital cases., 67 Other
Justices disagreed with petitioners that, as a matter of actual experience,
prosecutorial discretion posed problems of constitutional dimension.168
Part IIA of this Article examines the Court's treatment of the issue of
prosecutorial discretion. In Part IIB, the Article summarizes findings
concerning the manner in which Georgia prosecutors actually exercise
their discretion to seek a death sentence.' 69
A. Analysis
Of the seven Justices who voted to uphold the Georgia statute in
Gregg,'70 six addressed the issue of prosecutorial discretion.' 7 1 In an
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens insisted that no constitutional problem arose from unbridled
prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty in capital cases. 172 Jus-
tice White, whose opinion Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
joined, admitted that such discretion theoretically could create constitu-
tionally suspect arbitrariness, but maintained that, in fact, prosecutors
make their capital charging decisions in such a way as to avoid arbitrari-
ness. 173 Neither analysis nor experience supports either view.
The plurality dismissed the problem of prosecutorial discretion by us-
ing two questionable definitional devices. First, it limited the concept of
166. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976). Prosecuting attorneys make the decisions
to prosecute, to prosecute for a capital crime, to accept or reject a plea to a lesser charge, to seek or
not to seek a death sentence, without any legislative guidance. Some district attorney's offices have
promulgated informal guidelines, but the sanctions for varying from such guidelines are nonexistent.
Conversation with Fulton Co. Assistant District Attorney Wendy Schoob, July, 1982.
167. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
169. During the summer of 1982, a research assistant conducted telephone interviews with ap.
proximately 25 prosecutors, representing more than half the Georgia judicial circuits. Notes of these
conversations are on file with the author.
170. Only Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, expressing their view that the death penalty
is per se cruel and unusual punishment. 428 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
171. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, citing to the dissenting opinions in Furman.
Id. at 227 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 198-99 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). For the sake of convenience,
this opinion is referred to as the plurality opinion.
173. Id. at 224-26 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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arbitrariness for eighth amendment purposes, so as to exclude variation
resulting from nonsentencing discretion.' 74 The plurality insisted only
that there be some degree of uniformity among those eventually selected
for execution.' 75 For example, if all the murderers on death row had
committed murder during the course of a robbery, it would not matter
that the vast majority of such offenders had received life sentences. The
concurring Justices in Furman, including to some extent members of the
Gregg plurality, had suggested no such narrow view of the eighth amend-
ment. '76 If the eighth amendment forbids the infliction of capital punish-
ment in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the source of the
arbitrariness, or the point at which it appears, cannot be
determinative. 
77
Second, the plurality focused on defendants whom the legislature has
removed from the capital murder category rather than on defendants se-
lected for death. In response to petitioners' argument that arbitrary in-
fliction of the death penalty would occur as long as prosecutors had the
exclusive power to seek or not to seek the death penalty, the plurality
argued: "Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford
an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution."' 17  This re-
phrasing of the issue, so as virtually to guarantee agreement, suffers from
several flaws.
The first flaw is the failure, or refusal, to recognize the implications of
a decision to give mercy. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, in his book
Discretionary Justice, pointed out one shortcoming of the plurality's
reasoning:
The discretionary power to be lenient has a deceptive quality that is danger-
ous to justice. A fundamental fact about the discretionary power to be leni-
174 Id. at 199. Webster's Dictionary, however, offers no such refinement of the term: "arbi-
trary.. depending on choice or discretion." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 57
(1981).
175 A majority of the Supreme Court recently has adopted a shift in the definition of arbitrari-
ness that narrows the impact of eighth amendment requirements. See supra notes 42-57 and accom-
panying text.
176. Justice White specifically found an eighth amendment violation because "there is no mean-
ingful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972). See also supra note 27
(discussing differing approaches in Furman).
177 As Professor Black has put it: "I would be surprised if anyone were willing to espouse, in
clear terms, the view that uncontrolled discretion in a jury, when it comes to selecting a death
sentence, is wrong, while uncontrolled discretion at all the other strategically located stations on the
way to the electric chair is right." Black, supra note 82 at 127.
178. 428 U.S. at 199.
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ent is extremely simple and entirely clear and yet is usually overlooked:
The discretionary power to be lenient is an impossibility without the con-
comitant discretionary power not to be lenient, and injustice from the dis-
cretionary power not to be lenient is specially frequent; the power to be
lenient is the power to discriminate. 179
A decision to reprieve one defendant is merely the converse of the deci-
sion to send another to the death chamber.
The plurality's focus on the decision to grant an "individual" defend-
ant mercy is misleading in another related way. Although the prosecu-
tor's charging and pleading decisions deal with particular defendants, the
removal of certain defendants from the pool of potential capital defend-
ants creates the group of defendants from which those ultimately exe-
cuted will be chosen. Charging and pleading decisions about individual
defendants inevitably add up to decisions that define the class of capital
defendants. Logically, individual decisions to grant mercy also deter-
mine the ultimate makeup of death row.
In addition to the logical implications of prosecutorial "grants of
mercy," charging decisions may, under certain circumstances, have legal
consequences as well. If, as some empirical studies have suggested,180
prosecutors make capital charging decisions on the basis of race or sex of
the defendant, then a defendant charged with a capital crime may have a
viable selective enforcement claim based on the favored treatment of the
group not charged with a capital offense."' s At present, a defendant
claiming selective enforcement must show that "the government's dis-
criminatory selection of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad
faith or based on such impermissible considerations as race, religion or
the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights."'8 2 Even under
this stringent standard, death row inmates may be able to establish that
prosecutors systematically and disproportionately seek the death penalty
against, for example, killers of white victims.
While the plurality found no constitutional problems arising from
179. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1969).
180. See, e.g., Foley & Powell, The Discretion of Prosecutors, Judges, and Juries in Capital Cases,
7 CRIM. JUST. REV. 16 (1982) (concluding that all three participants are influenced by the sex of the
offenders, and that judges (but not juries) are influenced by the race of the victims); Zeisel, supra
note 45, at 466-68 (asserting that differences in the likelihood of receiving a death sentence based on
race of the defendant and race of the victim are largely caused by charging decisions).
181. A successful selective enforcement claim bars prosecution of the defendant. A defendant
who attacks selective enforcement of capital punishment wants to bar the charge of capital murder
against himself.
182. United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974).
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prosecutional discretion in capital cases, Justice White correctly saw the
potential for arbitrariness in the unbridled discretion of prosecutors to
seek death sentences whenever they choose. 183 Justice White recognized
that prosecutorial arbitrariness would violate the eighth amendment as
construed in Furman. In addition, Justice White recognized that the dis-
cretion not to charge a defendant with a capital offense is hidden from
review, and, therefore, the Georgia Supreme Court cannot correct arbi-
trary exercises of discretion.' 84 Justice White rejected petitioners' argu-
ment not because of the theoretical absence of a constitutional infirmity,
but because of his perceptions about how prosecutors actually exercise
their discretion.' His impressions about the behavior of prosecutors do
not, however, withstand close scrutiny.
Justice White made three basic assertions. First, he argued that prose-
cutors charge capital crimes if, and only if, the case is strong enough to
warrant such a charge and the jury is likely to impose a death sen-
tence. Second, these two standards constitute acceptable criteria for
the imposition of capital punishment. 87 Finally, because prosecutors
charge capital crimes only when the evidence warrants such a charge and
when the jury is likely to impose a death sentence, the Georgia Supreme
Court will review all cases properly falling into the "capital crime" cate-
gory.' 8 ' All three assertions are subject to challenge.
While the strength of the case and likelihood of a death sentence are
183. Justice White's concession is apparent from the way in which he rebutted petitioners' argu-
ment on prosecutorial discretion. He did not, as did the plurality, insist that courts need not scruti-
nize charging decisions; rather he asserted that as a matter of fact prosecutors exercise their
discretion in an acceptable fashion. 428 U.S. at 224-26 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
184. Id. at 225.
185 Id. at 225-26.
186 Justice White stated: "Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors
will be motivated in their charging decision by factors other than the strength of their case and the
likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts." Id. at 225.
187. Justice White stated his approval of this standard as follows:
Thus defendants will escape the death penalty through prosecutorial charging decisions
only because the offense is not sufficiently serious; or because the proof is insufficiently
strong. This does not cause the system to be standardless any more than the jury's decision
to impose life imprisonment on a defendant whose crime is deemed insufficiently serious or
it% decision to acquit someone who is probably guilty but whose guilt is not established
beyond a reasonable doubt.
ld,
188 On this point, Justice White asserted that "the prosecutor's charging decisions are unlikely
to have removed from the sample of cases considered by the Georgia Supreme Court any which are
truly "similar.' If the cases really were 'similar' in relevant respects, it is unlikely that prosecutors
would fail to prosecute them as capital cases; and I am unwilling to assume the contrary." Id.
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indeed factors Georgia prosecutors consider, they are by no means the
only factors considered when prosecutors make their charging decisions.
As this Article will discuss in more detail below, 89 not only do prosecu-
tors hold varying opinions about what constitutes a "strong" case in the
capital context, but they also take into consideration economic and other
factors when deciding whether to seek the death penalty.
Furthermore, the criteria Justice White identifies may pose constitu-
tional difficulties. The strength of the case against a defendant has no
logical bearing on the sentence he should receive. Any criminal case
must be strong enough to convince a jury of the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. If the proof not only convinces the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, but also satisfies all possible doubt as to the defend-
ant's guilt, then that fact, while insuring that the conviction is proper,190
should not increase the severity of the sentence. The notion that the
"strength of the case" should decide who dies and who does not produces
disturbing results that would seem to conflict with eighth amendment
principles. The charged crimes may be similar, equally heinous, and,
therefore, the defendants may be equally deserving of similar punish-
ment. The prosecutor, however, will charge one defendant with capital
murder and not the other, depending upon the amount or quality of evi-
dence. For example, in Ellis v. State, 9 ' the defendant robbed and killed
a 104-year-old wheelchair-bound man. The defendant strangled and
bludgeoned the victim to death. In Thomas v. State,'92 the defendant
beat and strangled to death a nine-year-old victim. Mr. Thomas received
a death sentence. The prosecution did not charge Mr. Ellis with capital
murder and he was given a life sentence. The prosecution's case against
Mr. Ellis was weak.' 93 Because it is the overall strength of the case and
189. See infra notes 203-18 and accompanying text.
190. Using the strength of the evidence does operate to reduce the chance of convicting and
executing someone who may in fact be innocent. While this consideration is of valid concern, as
noted in Part IC of this Article, a jury should not impose a life sentence based on questionable
evidence, either.
191. 248 Ga. 414, 283 S.E.2d 870 (1981).
192. 247 Ga. 233, 275 S.E.2d 318 (1981).
193. Telephone conversation with the Richmond County District Attorney's Office, June, 1982.
See also Milton v. State, 284 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981). In Milton, the defendant tried to rob the
victim, but when the victim resisted Milton hit the victim over the head, poured gasoline on him,
and set him on fire. In Hardy v. State, 247 Ga. 235, 275 S.E.2d 319 (1981), the defendant beat and
partially disrobed the victim to search for money. The defendant then poured gasoline over the
victim and then shot him. Mr. Hardy received a sentence of death. Mr. Milton was convicted of
arson and murder. The prosecutor never charged Milton with capital murder due to the weakness of
[Vol. 62:573
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not the strength of the evidence as to aggravating circumstances that af-
fects charging decisions, t94 the extreme penalty is meted out to those
sloppy or unlucky defendants who leave more traces of their crime than
their fellow criminals.
The second charging criterion that Justice White acknowledges and
approves is the "likelihood that the jury would impose the death pen-
alty."' 95 The difficulty with this criterion resembles the difficulty with
Georgia's statutory aggravating circumstance, (b)(7).196 Both run a very
fine line between being a legitimate standard and a catch-all category.
The criteria upon which a jury would be likely to impose the death pen-
alty could quite easily cover criteria the Court has already declared im-
permissible.' 9 7 For example, a district attorney might decide not to seek
the death penalty because a jury is less likely to impose the death penalty
on women or less likely to impose the death penalty on a white defendant
who killed a black man.'
98
Finally, Justice White is simply wrong in relying on the Georgia
Supreme Court's proportionality review to compare all "similar" cases.
The Georgia Supreme Court, by its own admission, considers only ap-
pealed convictions of capital crimes that resulted in sentences of death or
life imprisonment, and does not consider all cases in which prosecutors
the case against him. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed Milton's life sentence because the prose-
cution did not corroborate the accomplice's testimony. 248 Ga. at 197, 282 S.E.2d at 95.
194. An argument might be made that if the evidence of the presence of an aggravating circum-
stance is particularly persuasive, then that fact might properly affect the prosecutor's decision to seek
a death sentence. This argument is undercut considerably, however, by the all-inclusive nature of
the aggravating circumstances in general and the vague and necessarily subjective character of the
(b)(7) aggravating circumstance in particular. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
195. 428 U.S. at 225.
196. "The offense of murder. . . was outrageously vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
2534. l(b)(7) (1983). In Gregg, the Court warned the Georgia Supreme Court that it would consider
the provision unconstitutional if construed broadly. 428 U.S. at 201. In Godfrey, the Supreme Court
held that the Georgia court had used an impermissibly broad construction of the statute, and re-
versed the petitioner's sentence. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). See also Note, The Death
Penalty in Georgia: An Aggravating Circumstance, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 835 (1981) (maintaining that
(b)(7) is per se unconstitutional or at least that courts continue to apply it unconstitutionally).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Cammisano, 546 F.2d 238, 241 (8th Cir. 1976) (ethnic origin
criteria impermissible); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 623-24 (7th Cir. 1973) (political activity
impermissible criterion); United States v. Alleyne, 454 F. Supp. 1164, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (racial
criteria impermissible); supra notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text.
198. Recent studies confirm that the race of the victim is a decisive factor in Georgia. See supra
note 45.
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brought a capital charge. 199
B. Experience
Justice White boldly asserted that prosecutors base their decisions to
charge defendants with capital crimes solely on the strength of the case
against the defendant and the likelihood that a jury will impose a death
sentence. Justice White qualified this assertion, however, by referring to
the absence of facts supporting a contrary hypothesis. 2°° Interviews with
numerous prosecutors in Georgia demonstrate that Justice White's quali-
fication was more sound than his assumption. Prosecutors in the differ-
ent Georgia judicial circuits articulated vastly different charging
standards. The prosecutors' differing perceptions concerning when it is
appropriate to charge a capital crime may well account for the signifi-
cantly different rates of death penalty imposition among the circuits.20'
Prosecutors in Georgia judicial circuits2 2 that have high rates of im-
posing the death penalty generally charge a defendant with capital mur-
der any time they can make out a prima facie case for an aggravating
circumstance. 20 3 To the extent that this charging policy constitutes a
199. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
200. 428 U.S. at 225. Justice White's discussion of this issue is interlaced with the following:
Petitioner's argument. . . is unsupported by any facts. . . . [It is] unlikely that prosecu-
tors would. . . and I am unwilling to assume to the contrary ..... I decline to interfere
with the manner in which Georgia has chosen to enforce such laws on what is simply an
assertion of lack of faith in the ability of the system ofjustice to operate in a fundamentally
fair manner.
Id. at 225-26.
201. Differences are most strikingly correlated with the race of the victim, but are also evident
by region. See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 45, at 603 (Table 4).
202. The State of Georgia is divided into 159 counties, which in turn were grouped at the time of
this study into 42 judicial circuits. This Article adopts the regional groupings of these circuits used
by Bowers & Pierce, supra note 45: north (Lookout Mountain, Conasauga, Blue Ridge, Mountain,
Northeastern, Rome, Cherokee), central (Tallapoosa, Douglas, Cobb, Coweta, Griffin, Clayton,
Stone Mountain, Rockvale, Gwinnett, Alcovy, Piedmont, Western, Ocmulgee, Northern, Toombs,
Flint), Fulton County (Atlanta), southwest (Chattahoochee, Macon, Houston, Southwestern,
Pataula, Cordege, Tifton, Dougherty, South Georgia, Southern, Alapaha), southeast (Augusta, Mid-
dle, Dublin, Ogeechee, Oconce, Atlantic, Eastern, Waycross, Brunswick).
203. These circuits include but are not limited to (not all circuits responded): Toombs Judicial
Circuit (telephone conversation with Chip Wallace (August 23, 1982)); Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit
(telephone conversation with Joseph Briley, District Attorney for Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit (June 8,
1982)); Rome Judicial Circuit (telephone conversation with Larry Salmon, District Attorney for
Rome Judicial Circuit (June 1982); (Atlantic Judicial Circuit (telephone conversation with Dupont
K. Cheney, District Attorney for Atlantic Judicial Circuit (July 1982)), Alapaha Judicial Circuit
(telephone conversation with Robert Ellis, Assistant District Attorney for Alapaha Judicial Circuit
(August 23, 1982)). An assistant district attorney in the Alapaha Judicial Circuit at first said "we
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss4/2
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mandatory standard, it differs from the policy of other prosecutors. This
policy may also pose constitutional problems2" because it does not allow
the prosecutor to take into account adequately the individual circum-
stances of each offense.205 Moreover, a policy that dictates the filing of a
capital charge whenever an aggravating circumstance arguably is present
may constitute an abuse of prosecutorial discretion.20 6
Prosecutors in other circuits use a variety of standards to charge capi-
tal crimes. Often prosecutors make an effort to avoid capital trials, for
two reasons. The first is economic. Capital trials are time-consuming
and defendants are likely to appeal the verdict, thus making capital trials
expensive at a time when judicial resources are limited and calendars are
crowded.2 °7 The second reason follows from the first. Considering the
don't charge the death penalty all the time," but later explained that they did charge capital murder
whenever they could make out a good case for an aggravating circumstance. The examples he gave
as instances when they would not charge a defendant with capital murder were cases in which they
would have to stretch the death penalty statute to find aggravating circumstances.
204. In Gregg, the plurality indicated that such a mandatory charging system would be unconsti-
tutional. 428 U.S. at 199 n.50.
205. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (mandatory death penalty statute violates
eighth and fourteenth amendments); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (same).
206. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the mandatory policy of the District Attor-
ney's office of filing habitual criminal complaints against all defendants with three or more prior
felonies constituted an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. State v. Pettitt, 93 Wash. 2d 288, 295-96,
609 P.2d 1364, 1368 (1980) (petitioner's three felonies were basically joyriding charges). The peti-
tioner's specific arguments were that (1) "a policy which prevents the prosecutor from considering
mitigating factors is a failure to exercise discretion, which may, as in this case, result in an unfair and
arbitrary result.. .[and (2)] the [mandatory] policy did not afford minimum procedural due pro-
cess guarantees." Id. at 294, 609 P.2d at 1367. The court, quoting a Supreme Court case as author-
ity, assertedz
[The] decision to file criminal charges, with the awesome consequences it entails, requires
consideration of a wide range of factors in addition to the strength of the Government's
case, in order to determine whether prosecution would be in the public interest. Prosecu-
tors often need more information than proof of a suspect's guilt, therefore, before deciding
whether to seek an indictment.
Id. at 295, 609 P.2d at 1367 (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794 (1977)).
207. Several circuits expressed economic concerns over capital trials. Robert Wilson, District
Attorney for the Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit, stated that "we have to think long and hard about
trying to build a capital case; they [capital cases] are expensive and tie up a lot of people." (Tele-
phone conversation with Robert Wilson, District Attorney for Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit
(June 1982)). Wendy Schoob, an Assistant District Attorney for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit, stated
"we have an incredible case-load; ... capital cases take much more time [than other cases]." (Tele-
phone conversation with Wendy Schoob, Assistant District Attorney for Atlanta Judicial Circuit
(July 8, 1982)). Tom Charron, the District Attorney for the Cobb Judicial Circuit, stated "capital
cases put us under an enormous resources strain." (Telephone conversation with Tom Charron,
District Attorney for Cobb Judicial Circuit (July 8, 1982)). These three circuits are the largest in
Georgia. It is, therefore, not surprising that they expressed economic concerns over capital trials.
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expense of a capital trial, some district attorneys expressed frustration
about the number of defendants on death row, particularly because
Georgia did not execute anyone between 1964 and 1983.208 Thus, prose-
cutors could view them as a futile and expensive use of precious
resources.
209
In describing how they made the decision whether to seek a death sen-
tence in a given case, prosecutors alluded to a whole range of factors
208. The recent resumption of executions in Georgia, beginning with John Eldon Smith on De-
cember 15, 1983, might therefore encourage prosecutors to seek more death sentences. See infra
note 307.
209. Tom Charron, District Attorney for the Cobb Judicial Circuit, stated that "it's [the backlog
on death row] very frustrating; you begin to wonder if it [capital punishment] really means anything;
the state should impose sentences or get rid of it [capital punishment]." See supra note 207. In
addition, Mr. Floyd, Assistant District Attorney for the Flint Judicial Circuit, concluded: "It [the
lack of executions] makes the law mean less; . . . people won't believe in it [the law]; . . . the
legislature ought to fix it [see that executions take place] or abolish it." (telephone conversation with
Mr. Floyd, Assistant District Attorney for Flint Judicial Circuit (July 1982)).
The disturbing aspect of these views is that the jury is equally aware that no executions took place
in Georgia between 1964 and December, 1983. It is, therefore, conceivable that jurors will decide
that the defendant will not be executed and impose a death sentence to keep a defendant off the
streets for a longer time. A defendant serving a life sentence in Georgia is eligible for parole after
seven years. GA. CODE ANN. § 77-525(b) (1983).
The jury's view of the likelihood of execution has added significance because arguments to a jury
that tend to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility constitute reversible error. For example, when
jurors were told: "The Supreme Court of Georgia review[s] the entire proceedings. . . and the State
executes only guilty persons after they've been tried and convicted and appealed and everything
exhausted," the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the death sentence. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327,
335, 240 S.E.2d 833, 839 (1977). Similarly, when the jury was told that the trial judge and the
Supreme Court of Georgia will review any death sentence and that either could set aside any death
sentence, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the death sentence. Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142,
146, 240 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979). Again, when the jury was told of
the right of the trial court to impose a life sentence, even if the jury recommends death, and that the
appellate courts could set aside the sentence, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the death sen-
tence. Prevatte v. State, 233 Ga. 929, 931, 214 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1975).
The underlying reason for these decisions is that such comments had the "inevitable effect of
encouraging the jury to attach diminished consequences to their verdict and to take less than full
responsibility for their awesome task of determining life or death for the prisoners before them." Id.
at 931, 214 S.E.2d at 367. Cases in which courts held similar comments not to be reversible error are
distinguishable because the judge cautioned the jury and reminded it strongly of its responsibility.
Corn v. Hopper, 244 Ga. 28, 31, 257 S.E.2d 533, 536 (1979); Coker v. State, 234 Ga. 555, 572-73,
216 S.E.2d 782, 796 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). But cf Tamplin v. State,
235 Ga. 20, 24, 218 S.E.2d 779, 783 (1975), vacated in part, 235 Ga. 774, 775, 221 S.E.2d 435, 446
(1975) (prosecutor's argument that if the jury gave the defendant a life sentence he could escape held
not to be reversible error; court admitted the argument "approaches the border of violating the spirit
of the law").
The general knowledge that Georgia had not executed anyone since 1964 can not be countered
because it is not usually revealed to the jury in the course of a capital trial. It instead might rest in
the back of a juror's mind and subtly lessen his or her sense of ultimate responsibility.
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beyond the presence or absence of statutory aggravating circumstances.
Some stressed the extent to which the defendant premeditated or clearly
intended the crime.21 ° Others considered whether the murderer dis-
played a "total disregard for human life."' 21I Still others paid heed to the
reaction of the public to the crime21 2 or the standing of the victim in the
community. For example, in Wells v. State,2"3 the defendant, during an
attempted robbery, shot the victim, who had been preparing to locate
drugs for him. The victim died from bleeding some time later. In Jack-
son v. State,214 the defendant assaulted and then killed the victim. The
battery constituted an aggravating circumstance under (b)(7). The vic-
tim had several young boys visiting at the time and police suspected him
of being a homosexual. The low standing of these victims in the commu-
nity contributed to the decision not to seek death sentences in these two
cases.
2 15
210. The Flint, Atlanta, and Middle Judicial Circuits' District Attorneys' Offices expressed this
general concern. (telephone conversation with Wendy Schoob, Assistant District Attorney for the
Atlanta Judicial Circuit (June, 1982)); (telephone conversation with Mr. Floyd, Assistant District
Attorney for the Flint Judicial Circuit (July, 1982)); (telephone conversation with Rick Malone,
Assistant District Attorney for the Middle Judicial Circuit (July, 1982)).
Wally Speed, Assistant District Attorney for the Atlanta Circuit, referred to Lyons v. State, 247
Ga. 465, 277 S.E.2d 244 (1981), in which the defendant robbed and killed a man at a dice game. Mr.
Speed stated that because the robbery was basically an afterthought, it was not a real "murder for
money," GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(4) (1983), and, therefore, he did not charge the defendant
with capital murder (telephone conversation with Wally Speed, District Attorney for the Atlanta
Circuit (July, 1982)). Mike Whaley, another Atlanta Assistant District Attorney, referred to the
cases of Rachel v. State, Robinson v. State and Wright v. State (codefendants), 247 Ga. 130, 274
S.E.2d 475 (1981), where the three defendants robbed and murdered a housing authority employee.
Mr. Whaley said he did not charge the defendants with capital murder because the "whole thing was
spontaneous." (telephone conversation with Mike Whaley, Assistant District Attorney for Atlanta
Circuit (July, 1982)). Mr. Finlayson of the Houston Judicial Circuit referred to Anderson v. State,
248 Ga. 682, 285 S.E.2d 533 (1982), in which the female defendant killed her boyfriend by stabbing
him repeatedly with a paring knife. Mr. Finlayson did not charge capital murder because the crime
was not premeditated; "she didn't really mean to kill him." (telephone conversation with Mr. Finlay-
son of the Houston Judicial Circuit (July, 1982)).
211. District attorneys from Atlanta, supra note 207, Middle, supra note 210, Oconee (telephone
conversation with James Wiggins, District Attorney for the Oconee Judicial Circuit (July, 1982))
and Augusta (telephone conversation with Sam Sibley, District Attorney for Augusta Judicial Cir-
cuit (July, 1982)).
212. District attorneys from two circuits stated that public pressure could make one feel com-
pelled to "go for it," but added that no amount of public pressure would affect his or her decision if a
charge of capital murder was clearly inappropriate. Atlanta and Cobb, supra note 207.
213. 247 Ga. 792, 279 S.E.2d 213 (1981).
214. 248 Ga. 480, 284 S.E.2d 267 (1981).
215. Telephone conversation with Harvey Moskowitz, Assistant District Attorney for Atlanta
Judicial Circuit (July, 1982).
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Some prosecutors took into account what might be considered mitigat-
ing circumstances,21 6 while others hesitated to seek a death sentence if a
codefendant whom they perceived to be more culpable had not been sen-
tenced to death.21 7 One prosecutor even acknowledged that he charges
capital murder specifically to obtain a more conviction-prone jury
through the Witherspoon qualification.218
Empirical evidence thus demonstrates that prosecutors take into ac-
count a variety of factors when deciding whether to seek a death sen-
tence. Some of these factors may be proper considerations for making a
capital charging decision; others, such as the desire to obtain a convic-
tion-prone jury, clearly are not. Whether the considerations are entirely
proper, improper, or somewhere in between is not, however, the critical
point. What is critical for the purposes of the eighth amendment is that
prosecutors are nof evenhandedly charging defendants with capital
crimes. Even within a single state, the possibility that a prosecutor will
charge a defendant with a capital crime for the very same type of offense
varies greatly according to the views of the particular district attorney in
office in a given judicial circuit. '19 Such disparities may be acceptable in
216. In Holt v. State, 247 Ga. 648, 278 S.E.2d 390 (1981), the prosecutor did not charge the
defendant with capital murder for beating and killing his 23-month-old nephew because of his ex-
treme remorse. (Telephone conversation with Wally Speed, Assistant District Attorney for Atlanta
Judicial Circuit (July, 1982)). In Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981), the prosecutor
did not charge the defendant with capital murder because he had been found not guilty by reason of
insanity in a previous murder case.
217. Berry was one of three defendants who robbed a liquor store and killed the clerk. Berry
waited in the car while his codefendants went into the store. The prosecution did not seek the death
penalty against Berry because the jury could not decide on the appropriate sentence for one of the
more culpable codefendants. Berry v. State, 248 Ga. 430, 283 S.E.2d 888 (1981) (telephone conver-
sation with John Caldwell, District Attorney for Griffin Judicial Circuit (July, 1982)). In Sinns v.
State, 248 Ga. 385, 283 S.E.2d 479 (1981), the defendant was one of two men who beat and mur-
dered a dancer. The state did not seek the death penalty because the codefendant seemed much
more culpable. (Telephone conversation with Andy Weathers, Assistant District Attorney for At-
lanta Judicial Circuit (July, 1982)).
218. Telephone conversation with Bob Wilson, District Attorney for Stone Mountain Judicial
Circuit (July, 1982). In his opinion, if not in the view of the Supreme Court, jury qualification under
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) does produce a jury more likely to find a defendant
guilty. Id. at 517. Recent cases support his opinion. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273
(E.D. Ark. 1983).
219. Of course, the chances that a prosecutor will charge a defendant with a capital crime are
even more drastically different among the states. The southern states and California impose by far
the greatest number of death sentences. Death Row, U.S.A., NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc. at 4-17 (June, 1983).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss4/2
Number 4] DEATH PENALTY IN GEORGIA
other contexts; 220 they raise serious questions when a life is at stake.
III. EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
A. The Theories Behind Clemency
Capital clemency, the modification of a death sentence to a lesser pun-
ishment, 221 has a curious role in a constitutional system that allows for
the death penalty. According to the United States Supreme Court, clem-
ency is essential to any capital punishment system.222 Unlike the judicial
proceedings that lead up to a death sentence, capital clemency is not sub-
ject to due process 22 3 or to any ascertainable rules.224  As the Supreme
Court recently observed: "Commutation . . . is an ad hoc exercise of
executive clemency. A governor may commute a sentence at any time
220. For a discussion of sentencing disparities, see Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Im-
prisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1131-36 (1979).
221 Clemency encompasses a variety of executive acts, including pardon, commutation, and
reprieve. Georgia courts have defined pardon as follows: "An act of mercy flowing from the foun-
tain of bounty and grace." Randall v. State, 73 Ga. App. 354, 376, 36 S.E.2d 450, 463 (1945), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 749 (1946). Courts have defined commutation as "[tihe executive act reducing the
terms of a sentence already imposed, substituting lesser for greater punishment." Hagelberger v.
United States, 445 F.2d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 925 (1972). "A reprieve by
the executive is nothing but a temporary suspension for the period named in the respite for the
execution of the sentence imposed by the court." Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 114, 135 S.E.
481, 485 (1926). This section will refer interchangeably to clemency and commutation to describe
the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment or to a term of years.
222. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.). See also Note, A Matter of Life And Death: Due Process Protection in Capital Clemency Pro-
ceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889 (1981) ("Each state whose capital punishment law has been approved by
the Supreme Court since Furman v. Georgia has a clemency provision.").
223. In Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976
(1979), the court of appeals rejected a claim that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
applies to capital clemency decisions. Id. at 617-619. The Supreme Court has not addressed capital
commutation since Gregg, except peripherally in California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983)
(mandatory instruction in capital sentencing trial that governor could modify sentence of life with-
out parole did not inject irrelevant consideration into sentencing decision). With regard to noncapi-
tal commutation, the Court has ruled that when the clemency authority has complete discretion and
no explicit standards, no due process duty requires it to supply an applicant with reasons for the
denial of clemency. The Court has held broadly that "the power vested in the Connecticut Board of
Pardons to commute sentences conferred no rights on [applicants] ...beyond the right to seek
commutation." Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981). See also Note
supra note 222, at 890 n.5.
224. Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 143 (1964) (empirical
study of capital clemency procedures made just before the virtual cessation of executions in the
United States).
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for any reason without reference to any standards." '225 While the con-
cept of ad hoc executive decisions is familiar, recent eighth amendment
analysis suggests that total discretion may not satisfy the Constitution
when the decision is to take or spare a life.226
Capital clemency is final in two respects. First, clemency is immune
from judicial review.227 Executive clemency is deliberately "extrajudicial
in nature, '228 in part because its function is to afford "relief from undue
harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the crim-
inal law.",229  In recognition of the fallibility of the judicial system, the
legislature not only gave the executive the power to commute or pardon,
but also authorized the executive to exercise this power with "full discre-
tion" in order to maximize its potential effectiveness. 230 The second way
in which capital commutation is final is more immediate. Commutation
is traditionally the last decision made as to whether the state will actually
execute a defendant facing a sentence of death.23'
The possibility of executive clemency thus presents another vehicle by
which arbitrariness and caprice may, even under post-Furman statutes,
continue to infect the capital sentencing process. Faced with a challenge
that the highly discretionary executive clemency stage undermined the
attempted evenhandedness of the new Georgia death penalty statute, the
plurality in Gregg responded: "Nothing in any of our cases suggests that
the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Consti-
tution. ' 232 The plurality indicated that a system of capital punishment
without clemency would not only be "totally alien to our notions of crim-
225. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3015 (1983). This observation on noncapital commutation
summarizes the nature of the capital commutation process as well.
226. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), the Court set aside North Carolina's
mandatory death sentence statute. In doing so the Court noted that special due process concerns
arise when a defendant's life hangs in the balance.
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two. Because of the qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Id. at 305.
227. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950) ("Seldom, if ever, has this power of executive
clemency been subjected to review by the courts.").
228. Note, supra note 224, at 152.
229. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925).
230. Id. at 120-21.
231. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 13 (1950) ("the last word that spells life or death").
232. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.),
But see supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (removing certain people from the class of those
subject to the death penalty leaves those who remain arbitrarily selected).
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inal justice," '233 but would be unconstitutional as well.234
It is ironic that discretion, which the Supreme Court has limited under
the eighth amendment elsewhere in the capital sentencing process, is the
central characteristic of clemency. Courts have defended the unlimited
discretion associated with clemency in various ways. Constitutional pro-
tections in the trial and sentencing stage are seen to justify the lack of due
process protections and substantive standards in capital clemency deci-
sionmaking.235 The Supreme Court justifies the lack of constitutional
standards in the clemency decision with the executive's concern for the
individual. The Supreme Court observed that "individual acts of clem-
ency inherently call for discriminating choices because no two cases are
the same."
236
If the experience of pre-Furman capital punishment is any indication,
the Court should regard unlimited executive discretion warily. Studies of
the exercise of capital clemency in several states revealed that, more often
than not, executives made "discriminating choices" in favor of white
death row inmates.237 It is too early to tell, however, whether the pattern
of discrimination that is evident in the pre-Furman clemency processes
will continue. In fact, it is difficult to discern any kind of a pattern, be-
cause while there are over a hundred people on death row in Georgia,
238
only seven have applied for commutation since 1976.239 This hiatus may
soon be over.
As more and more death row inmates exhaust direct and collateral
233. 428 U.S. at 199 n.50.
234. Id.
235. In Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976
(1979), the court reasoned that once the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Spinkellink's death sen-
tence, the state could then constitutionally carry out the sentence. Id. at 618-19. The decision by
the state's executive to consider commutation was not covered by due process protections; instead it
was a process that is "not the business of federal judges." Id. at 619.
236. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 268 (1974).
237. Bowers & Pierce, supra note 45, at 577-79. "In 1940, Charles Magnum reported that...
clemency disproportionately favored white as opposed to black offenders sentenced to death." Id. at
579. Examining capital commutation decisions in the 1920's and 1930's for nine southern states (not
including Georgia), "Magnum showed that in every state commutations were more likely for whites
than for blacks on death row." Id. While these studies did not include Georgia, they do illustrate, in
her neighboring states, the nexus between racial discrimination and the decision to grant mercy.
238. Death Row, U.S.A., NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., at 9 (June 20, 1983).
239 Telephone conversations with L. Silas Moore, Deputy Director, Central Operations, State
Board of Pardons and Paroles (September and December, 1983), with John Charles Boger, NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, Inc. (December, 1984), and with George Kendall, ACLU of Georgia (January,
1985).
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attacks on their sentences, a process that the Court now seems deter-
mined to hasten,2" more applications for capital clemency probably will
arise. This potential increase in clemency applications will, therefore,
force the public and the courts to focus on what has been a largely dor-
mant clemency process. No matter how diligently, conscientiously, and
fairly the executives exercise clemency authority, there are limits to what
it can achieve. If capital sentencing discretion, which statutory classifica-
tions and appellate review attempt to monitor, produces such arbitrary
results, clemency discretion, without any statutory guidelines or judicial
review and governed solely by the good intentions of the executives, is
unlikely to result in less arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
B. The Clemency Structure in Georgia
In Georgia the state constitution vests the State Board of Pardons and
Paroles with "the power of executive clemency, including the powers to
grant reprieves, pardons and paroles, [and] to commute penalties."24
240. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983), the Court approved of expedited appellate
procedures for a death row inmate first federal habeas petition. Id. at 3394. The Court warned that
a stay of execution was not automatic in federal habeas proceedings; the district court should not
automatically issue a certificate of probable cause. Id. at 3393-94. If the district court does issue a
certificate of probable cause, the appeals court "should" grant a stay. Id. at 3394. Finally, the Court
stated that "stays of execution are not automatic pending the filing and consideration of a petition
for a writ of certiorari from this Court to the Court of Appeals that has denied a writ of habeas
corpus." Id. at 3395. One recent example of the Court's commitment to haste was in the denial of
an initial application for a stay made by Gene Autry, a Texas death row inmate, made days before
his scheduled execution, even though Texas did not oppose the stay. A second application was
granted at nearly the last possible moment. Autry v. Estelle, 104 S. Ct. 24 (1983).
241. GA. CONST. art. IV, § II, para. I and II(a) (1943, amended 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-
1701 & 1702(a) (1983).
Initially, the Georgia Governor alone held clemency authority. GA. CONsT. art. V, para. XII
(1877, amended 1943). A 1943 constitutional amendment, 1943 Ga. Laws 43 (ratified Aug. 4, 1943),
created the Board, giving it clemency power, GA. CONST. art. V, para. XII (1943, amended 1982),
subject only to the governor's refusal to stay an execution, GA. CONsT. art. V, para. XII (1877,
amended 1943). Thus, in effect, the governor retained power to veto the Board's decision to grant
clemency. This odd sharing of the capital clemency decision reflected either the legislature's unease
with vesting complete power in the Board, or its inability to take all of the clemency power from the
governor. This arrangement may have been less draconian in practice than it appears to be on paper,
because the Board, after receiving an application, would apparently ask the governor for a reprieve,
rather than leaving that request up to the individual. Parole Board Basics, State Board of Pardons
and Paroles at 4 (June, 1980) (copy on file with the author). The Constitution of 1982 eliminated
this provision, and the Board now has full discretion to stay an execution or to consider capital
commutation. GA. CONST. 1982, art. IV, § II, para. 11 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-1702 (1983).
The Board "did not seek the provision . . ." eliminating the governor's power. Biennial Report,
State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 1 (Fiscal Years 1981 and 1982) (copy on file with the author).
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Only the Board's discretion guides its ultimate decision whether to com-
mute a death sentence.242
The Board's clemency application process is also characterized by un-
reviewable discretion. Days or hours before a scheduled execution, the
Board may receive an application for capital commutation. 243 The appli-
cation must be in writing, and must state grounds for requesting clem-
ency. 244  Persons other than the condemned can apply for
commutation.245 If no one applies, the Board may still consider commu-
Under either arrangement, the decision whether to consider an application is without standards or
review and is final. Under the present arrangement, the discretion is consolidated in the Board.
In practice, the Board has not always had the autonomy it had in theory; it was very much a
creature of the political process. The Board consists of five members, appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the senate, who serve staggered seven-year terms. GA. CONST. art. V, para. XII (1877,
amended 1943). Gubernatorial displeasure with uninterrupted seven-year terms for board members
gave rise to a great deal of conflict that eventually erupted into a lawsuit. In Partain v. Maddox, 227
Ga. 623, 182 S.E.2d 450 (1971), the Georgia Supreme Court held that the governor's extraction of
undated letters of resignation and other acts designed to pressure board members violated the Geor-
gia constitution. Id. at 630, 182 S.E.2d at 456. Partain was the chairman of the Board of Pardons
and Paroles; Maddox was a member of the Board whom the governor had appointed. The gover-
nor's name was also Maddox. Id. at 624, 182 S.E.2d at 451. Governor Maddox's practice of requir-
ing appointees to give him an undated letter of resignation before taking office prompted an
investigation by the Georgia legislature. Id. After (or perhaps before) Board member Maddox's
testimony on January 7, 1971, before a committee investigating this practice, the governor sent Mad-
dox a telegram accepting his resignation, id. at 453, and Partain ordered the locks changed in the
Board offices. Id. Two executive orders from the new governor, Jimmy Carter, followed this lock-
out. One accepted Maddox's resignation because he was unfit to serve; the other filled the vacancy
with a new Board member. The Georgia Supreme Court declared Member Maddox's resignation
ineffective and declared him to be the incumbent board member. Id.
242, GA. CODE ANN. § 77-534 (1983). Georgia courts have consistently held that the Board's
exercise of its clemency powers is discretionary. See, e.g., State v. Hanson, 249 Ga. 739, 745, 295
S.E.2d 297, 302 (1982); Davis v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 605, 605-06, 193 S.E.2d 617, 618 (1972).
243. Telephone conversations with L. Silas Moore, supra note 239. There are several reasons for
this close timing. First, the Board requires an inmate to exhaust state and federal judicial remedies
before it will decide whether to consider clemency. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2518 (1983); Rules of the
State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Ch. 475-3.10(2)9(b) (amended October 17, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Amended Rules; copy on file with the author]. There typically is not much time between the
exhaustion of judicial relief, resulting in the end of a stay and a remand to the Superior Court, and
the execution date. Time spent seeking judicial relief at a higher federal level may well reduce this
interval further. The result is that clemency starts out as a last-minute, last hope.
244. Amended Rules, supra note 243.
245. Parole Board Basics, supra note 241, at 4. In one of the seven capital commutation applica-
tions since Gregg, the Board considered an application made on behalf of an inmate by the director
of the Georgia Indigent Defense Fund. State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Commutation Proceed-
ing 1, Jack Howard Potts (May 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Potts Clemency Opinion; copy on file
with the author]. Other states are less flexible. For example, the execution of Steven Judy in 1981
was preceded by the refusal of the Indiana clemency commission to accept a third-party application
for clemency "for reasons of standing." Note, supra note 222, at 890-91, n.7.
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tation.246 Consideration is by no means, however, automatic.247
The Board's current rules provide that it will not make a decision
whether to consider commutation until the defendant has exhausted or
abandoned all his available appeals.2 4' The Board does conduct an inves-
tigation on death row inmates as soon as the Supreme Court of Georgia
has affirmed their death sentences.249 If the Board decides to consider a
capital clemency application, but there is insufficient time before the exe-
cution to "conduct a complete and fair review of the case," the Board
may stay the execution for no longer than 90 days.25 Under the new
rules, however, the investigation should be complete well before a death
row inmate files application for clemency.25 If that is the case, the
Board's initial decision whether to consider an application in fact be-
comes the decision whether to grant clemency.252 The Board apparently
has complete discretion to refuse even to consider a grant of clemency.253
The investigation is thus the most critical stage in the clemency pro-
cess.254 The investigation consists of an examination of the "detailed cir-
cumstances of the offense, the offender's background, the conduct of the
trial, [and] the appellate record. ' 255 The Board also conducts "extensive
interviews with persons whose knowledge may shed additional light on
246. Telephone conversation with L. Silas Moore, supra note 239; Parole Board Basics, supra
note 241, at 4.
247. Amended Rules, supra note 243. The Georgia Supreme Court has stated that a death row
inmate has a right to submit an initial application to the Board and that further applications are
discretionary. McLendon v. Everett, 205 Ga. 713, 718, 55 S.E.2d 919, 123 (1949). When the court
decided McLendon, the governor's unreviewable power to refuse to stay an execution, preventing the
Board from considering an application for commutation, tempered this right. Because the current
Board's rules make even the decision to consider an application discretionary, it appears that Geor-
gia inmates have the right to apply for commutation, but no right to have that application consid-
ered. See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465-67 (1981).
248. Amended Rules, supra note 243.
249. Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Board Policy Statement, June 21, 1983, para.
1 & para. 2. [Hereinafter cited as Board Policy Statement; copy on file with the author].
250. Id. at para. 1. In the absence of the chairman any designated member of the Board can
issue a stay order. Id. at para. 3. Successive applications for a stay require a majority vote. Id. at
para. 5.
251. Amended Rules, supra note 243, positively state this goal. The current practice of complet-
ing the investigation before the application is made eliminates one of the main reasons for, and the
likelihood of, issuance of a stay. Formerly, the stay provided time to conduct the investigation that
is now generally complete before the Board receives the application.
252. See infra notes 304-24 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 247.
254. Note, supra note 224, at 148 ("its importance cannot be overestimated").
255. Parole Board Basics, supra note 241, at 4.
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the case." '256 In addition, the Board routinely solicits the opinions of the
trial judge and the prosecuting attorney.257 The Board will interview ju-
rors and codefendants.258 Georgia law requires the Board to obtain cer-
tain types of information for all clemency applications. 259  The chief
parole officer of the circuit of conviction conducts the investigation and
compiles a report, which the Board places in its central files until an
application arrives.2 "°
The investigation provides "the state's last opportunity to gather infor-
mation about the prisoner and his conduct, and to formulate an official
response.",26' The investigation is critically important because no law or
standard governs clemency and because the clemency authority will exer-
cise its discretion based upon the facts the state uncovers in the investiga-
tion. In Georgia, the information the Board obtains is classified as a state
secret.262 Although the Board undertakes a thorough investigation, a
risk exists of incomplete or erroneous information. Because these investi-
gations are secret, an inmate will not be able to discover any erroneous
information.263 This is a risk that the clemency applicant must take.264
The Board's full consideration of a clemency application "may or may
not include a hearing., 265 If the Board holds a hearing, the inmate usu-
ally is not present, although the inmate's attorney may be.266 The Board
256, Id.
257. Telephone conversations with L. Silas Moore, supra note 239.
258. See, e.g., infra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
259. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 77-511, 512 & 516 (1983). Among other things the statute requires the
Board to investigate the circumstances of the crime, any social, physical, mental or criminal record
of the inmate, and the inmate's behavior while in prison. Id.
260. Telephone conversations with L. Silas Moore, supra note 239.
261. Note, supra note 222, at 898.
262. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 77-533 & 77-512(b) (1983).
263. The price of having the Board gather most of this nonpublic information is that the defend-
ant does not have an opportunity to examine it. Several other problems inhere in the Board's as-
sumption of the investigatory burden:
Institutional factors may prevent some information from being obtained. The applicant
may not trust the state's investigator and may decline to reveal information that otherwise
might be helpful to him. Witnesses for the applicant may be intimidated by the state inter-
viewer. Moreover, the state investigator's role is distinct from that of an advocate for the
applicant...
Note, supra note 222, at 900 n.60.
264. In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1977), the Supreme Court found a similar risk
unacceptable in the sentencing phase of capital trials.
265. Amended Rules, see supra note 243.
266. In three of the seven recent clemency applications, the Board held a public hearing. Coun-
sel represented two applicants at the hearing. See infra notes 282-303 and accompanying text. (tele-
phone conversations with L. Silas Moore, supra note 239).
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serves notice and a copy of the application on the district attorney of the
circuit of conviction prior to the hearing.267 The Board allows the attor-
ney for the applicant and the prosecuting attorney to present witnesses,
introduce evidence, and argue.26 I The hearings can be quite lengthy.269
After the Board completes the investigation, it decides whether to
grant capital clemency. An affirmative vote by a majority of the Board is
necessary for a decision in favor of clemency.2 70 The Board then issues a
signed opinion.27' For the Board to grant capital clemency, there must be
"substantial evidence of sufficiently mitigating facts. '272 Apparently, the
Board considers sentencing disparity a sufficiently mitigating fact.273
The Board's decision is the heart of the clemency process; here the
Board's unlimited discretion has its greatest effect. In the past, the Board
has not been reluctant to exercise its discretion in favor of life. When the
Board actively practiced capital clemency, it commuted 41 death
sentences, and declined to commute 146.274 No empirical study of those
decisions has been conducted to ascertain whether the Board exercised
its discretion rationally or arbitrarily. 275 Although the five recent clem-
ency decisions discussed in the next section represent too small a sam-
pling to disclose a trend, they illuminate the Board's conduct and provide
some insight into the process that culminates in "the last word that spells
life or death. 2
76
C. Post-Gregg Clemency Applications
The Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles has received seven clem-
ency applications since 1976. The Board summarily denied the four
most recent applications without a hearing.277 In addition, the Board de-
267. Parole Board Basics, supra note 241, at 4.
268. Telephone conversations with L. Silas Moore, supra note 239.
269. Id.
270. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-20 (1983).
271. Id. § 42-9-42(b).
272. Parole Board Basics, supra note 241, at 4. This standard is also enunciated in three of the
seven clemency opinions rendered after Gregg. See infra notes 281-303 and accompanying text.
273. Parole Board Basics, supra note 241, at 4.
274. See Note, supra note 224, at 191 (the period 1946 to 1963). Before the December, 1983,
execution of John Eldon Smith, the last Georgia execution had taken place in 1964. W. BOWERS,
EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 261 (1967).
275. But see supra note 237.
276. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 13 (1950).
277. Applications of John Eldon Smith, Alpha Otis Stephens, Ivon Ray Stanley and Roosevelt
Green. For a discussion of the Smith and S.tephens applications, see infra notes 304-24 and accom-
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nied two other applications after hearings, but collateral attacks on the
sentences in the courts have prevented the executions from going for-
ward.278 Finally, the Board granted one application after a hearing.279
Because the Board has revised its procedures during this period to re-
quire that defendants make their collateral attacks on the sentence before
the Board considers their applications for clemency,28° it seems likely
that summary dispositions will become the norm. The granting of clem-
ency may become even more exceptional.
Charles Harris Hill was the first condemned inmate to apply for clem-
ency after Gregg.28 t The Board commuted his sentence.282 In Hill v.
State,283 three men participated in the robbery and murder of the victim
in his home. The evidence indicated that the prosecutor believed that
Gary Watts killed the victim by slitting his throat. The prosecutor al-
lowed Watts to plead guilty to robbery and murder, in return for a sen-
tence of life and twenty years. The prosecutor allowed James Brown, Jr.,
who had tried to protect the victim, to plead guilty to voluntary man-
slaughter, in return for a ten year sentence. Hill planned the robbery,
beat the victim, tried to kill him, and told the others that the victim
should die. He pleaded not guilty and presented an alibi defense. The
jury found him guilty and recommended a death sentence, which it based
upon a finding of two aggravating circumstances.284
panying text. Mr. Stanley was executed on July 12, 1984. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1984 at A18, cols.
4-5. He was not granted a hearing before the Board. (conversation with John Charles Boger, supra
note 239). Mr. Green was executed on January 9, 1985. See supra note 157. The Board, somewhat
troubled by his case, requested an informal conference with his attorney. It then denied the applica-
tion without a hearing hours before the execution. (conversation with George Kendall, ACLU of
Georgia (January 28, 1985)).
278 Applications of Horace William Dix and Jack Howard Potts. See infra notes 291-303.
279. Application of Charles Harris Hill. See infra notes 285-90 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text. Almost all death row prisoners pursue,
usually with the aid of volunteer counsel, collateral proceedings in both state and federal court after
their direct appeals are denied. (conversation with John C. Boger, NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
Inc., 99 Hudson Street, N.Y., N.Y. 10013 (January, 1984)).
281. Telephone conversations with L. Silas Moore, supra note 239.
282. Hill Clemency Opinion, p. 3.
283. 237 Ga. 794, 229 S.E.2d 737 (1976).
284. The Supreme Court of Georgia disregarded the (b)(1) finding, which involved the "substan-
tial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," because the language was unconstitutionally
vague Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976). Because the court found this case to lie
"at the core" of the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance, however, it upheld the death sentence on that
basis.
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A divided court affirmed Hill's death sentence.28 5 The majority was
careful not to hold that Hill had actually done the killing. Instead, the
court justified his death sentence by first explaining why the particularly
heinous circumstances of the murder warranted a death sentence for
someone, based on (b)(7). Second, the court described Hill as the "prime
mover," from the initial entry into the victim's home to his "signalling
for the victim's death" in this "execution-style" murder. Justice Ingram
dissented,2" 6 urging the court to modify the sentence to life imprison-
ment. Justice Ingram was particularly concerned because the prosecutor
had allowed Watts, the actual killer, to plead guilty in return for a life
sentence. Justice Ingram was unable to conclude that Hill's death sen-
tence, when compared to the life sentence Watts received for the same
crime, was "neither excessive nor disproportionate."2 7
After the Georgia Supreme Court denied a rehearing on October 26,
1976, Hill did not petition the United States Supreme Court for certio-
rari, nor did he take any other legal action to overturn his sentence.28
His attorney applied for clemency on June 29, 1977. On July 5, the
Board asked the Governor to stay the execution so that it could consider
the application. On July 7, the appointed day of Hill's execution, the
Governor granted a 90 day stay. In the course of its investigation, which
included a public hearing on Hill's application, the Board arranged to
have Hill, his codefendants, members of the jury, and officials of the
court interviewed. In its opinion, the Board revealed that an unusual
array of those who had been involved in the trial now urged commuta-
tion. The trial judge recommended commutation, as did the assistant
district attorney who had prosecuted the case. Jurors, the Board stated,
did not know that Watts had received life imprisonment when they rec-
ommended the death penalty for Hill. As a result of its investigation, the
Board determined that Watts had in fact killed the victim.
In view of this determination, the Board reached the same conclusion
285. Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 794, 229 S.E.2d 737 (1976). Justice Ingram wrote a dissenting opin-
ion. Justice Gunther also dissented, but wrote no opinion. Id. at 802, 229 S.E.2d at 743.
286. Id. at 802, 229 S.E.2d at 743.
287. The court's affirmance of Hill's death sentence is difficult to reconcile with its opinion in
Cervi v. State, 248 Ga. 325, 282 S.E.2d 629 (1981), see supra notes 106 & 107 and accompanying
text, in which the court justified a death sentence for Cervi, who had cut the victim's throat, despite
the fact that Wilson, a codefendant, who had ordered the killing and hit the victim, received a life
sentence.
288. Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Hill's Clemency Opinion (Sept.
28, 1977).
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as Justice Ingram had earlier, that because Hill received a death sentence
and Watts received life, "equal justice had not prevailed." The Board
commuted Hill's death sentence to a term of 99 years.289
It is not remarkable that the Board commuted Hill's sentence; what is
remarkable is that the Georgia Supreme Court earlier had affirmed it.
The similarity in the opinions of the dissenting judge and the Board sug-
gests that the Board's extensive investigation was not necessary to deter-
mine that Hill had received an excessive sentence. At least one Georgia
Supreme Court justice had already determined from the record before
the court that Hill's sentence was excessive.290
In the next two applications for clemency, those of Horace William
Dix and Jack Howard Potts, neither the prosecutors who had argued in
favor of death nor the judges who had imposed the sentence recom-
mended commutation. The Board denied both applications for
clemency.291
Dix brutally murdered his former wife; he also kidnapped her mother,
sister, and niece.292 Dix initially evaded arrest, but surrendered two
weeks later at the sheriff's office. The savagery of the murder lent credi-
bility to Dix's defense of lack of mental responsibility. The jury found
him guilty of murder and three counts of kidnapping, and recommended
the death penalty based upon a finding of a section (b)(7) aggravating
circumstance. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the verdict and sen-
tence on January 4, 1977. The court's sentence review did not address
the possibly mitigating factor of Dix's mental state at the time of the
crime.
After the state trial court denied Dix's petition for a writ of habeas
289. The Board's modification of Hill's sentence to a term of years probably reflected its judg-
ment that Hill should be eligible for parole in less than twenty-five years. Had the Board commuted
the sentence to life imprisonment, Hill would have had to serve twenty-five years, GA. CONST., art.
IV, § II, para. II(e) (1982), while Watts, serving a life plus 20 years sentence, would be eligible for
parole after seven years. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-45(b) (1983).
290 Hill's case presented several factors that frequently motivate clemency authorities to com-
mute death sentences. The fact that the codefendant, who was almost certainly more culpable, re-
ceived a life sentence supports commutation "almost as a matter of course." Note, supra note 224, at
164. The fact that two justices of the Georgia Supreme Court dissented from the court's opinion
affirming the sentence would also weigh heavily in favor of commutation. Id. at 170. The fact that
the prosecuting attorney recommended clemency is ordinarily sufficient to commute a death sen-
tence; the fact that the trial judge agreed made the case even stronger. Id. at 171.
291. Dix and Potts Clemency Opinions. Georgia did not execute Dix and Potts after the Board's
decision because they pursued further attacks on their sentences in court.
292 Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209, 232 S.E.2d 47 (1977).
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corpus, the state rescheduled Dix's execution for February 22, 1978.293
On February 15, 1978, Dix's attorney submitted a clemency application
to the Board. At the Board's request, the Governor granted a 90 day
stay on February 21, 1978.
The Board conducted an investigation, held a public hearing, and de-
nied clemency. In support of its conclusion that "substantial evidence of
sufficiently mitigating factors was not present," the Board described the
details of the murder, Dix's attempt to conceal the crime, and the kid-
napping of the victim's relatives. The Board rejected Dix's claim that he
was not mentally responsible at the time of the crime. After the denial of
his application for clemency, Dix avoided execution by simultaneously
pursuing direct and collateral relief.2 94
Two different juries sentenced Jack Howard Potts to death.295  Potts
did not seek clemency,296 but several interested attorneys filed petitions
on Potts' behalf, which the Board denied.297 In Cobb County, in May,
1975, Potts shot and wounded Eugene Snyder after an argument. Potts
then robbed Snyder, left him for dead, and kidnapped Michael Priest.298
In Forsyth County, Potts marched Priest into a field and shot and killed
him. The police captured Potts after a gunfight in which the police
wounded Potts. Potts was indicted, tried, and sentenced to death in both
Cobb and Forsyth counties. In his second trial, Potts unsuccessfully
raised an insanity defense. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
293. Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from the Dix Clemency Opinion (May
18, 1978).
294. See Dix v. State, 244 Ga. 464, 260 S.E.2d 863 (1979) (affirming denial of extraordinary
motion for new trial), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). For a description of Dix's state and federal
habeas efforts, see Dix v. Zant, 249 Ga. 527, 294 S.E.2d 527 (1982). The degree ofjudicial review in
direct and collateral attacks to a death sentence underscores the limitations of the clemency process
in assessing the procedural fairness of an applicant's trial. The Pardons Board can perceive and
respond to gross errors, as it did in Hill, but it is neither equipped nor intended to assure compliance
with the more subtle aspects of capital due process.
295. Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 243 S.E.2d 510 (1978).
296. Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727, 730 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981).
297. Potts Clemency Application, p. 3.
298. Many of the facts in Potts' case came to light only in the federal habeas proceedings that
followed the Board's denial of clemency. Federal habeas proceedings resulted in the following opin-
ions: Davis v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Daniels v. Zant, 494 F. Supp. 720
(M.D.Ga. 1980); Potts v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981); Potts v. Zant, 734 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1984) (reversing
the Cobb County conviction and both death sentences). A coherent narrative of these legal actions
can be found in Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727, 730-36 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981). The
following facts are taken from that opinion and the original opinion by the Georgia Supreme Court
on direct appeal. Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 243 S.E.2d 510 (1978).
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convictions and death sentences on March 16, 1978. As a federal judge
later observed, "[flor reasons that are not entirely clear, [Potts'] attor-
neys did not petition . . . for certiorari" to the United States Supreme
Court.2 99
Potts appealed the denial of a state habeas writ. Finally, Potts' attor-
neys informed him that further appeals would be futile and that all he
could hope for was to delay execution long enough for the legislature to
abolish the death penalty. The evidence is unclear whether this devastat-
ing advice precipitated or affirmed Potts' decision to withdraw his appeal
with the courts. Potts decided to abandon all efforts to overturn his con-
viction and sentence, and he consistently adhered to that decision until
well after the Board denied his clemency application. Despite Potts'
written requests, the Georgia Supreme Court refused to allow him to
withdraw his appeal. At the same time, however, the court allowed him
to discharge his attorneys and denied his appeal. On February 1, 1980,
both the Cobb and Forsyth courts rescheduled Potts' execution for Feb-
ruary 15, 1980.
Consistent with his earlier decision, Potts did not seek clemency. On
February 5, 1980, the director of the Georgia Indigent Defense Council
applied to the Board for commutation of Potts' sentence.3°° Two days
before the execution, the governor granted the Board's request for a stay.
The Board then undertook the problematic task of deciding whether to
spare the life of one who sought his own execution. 30i A Pardons Board
executive officer interviewed Potts. Although this officer described Potts
as rational during that interview, the Board asked two psychologists to
examine Potts. 302 The Board held a public hearing, at which Potts was
299. Potts v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
300. Potts Clemency Opinion (May 1, 1980).
301. Two death-sentenced inmates, Gary Gilmore and Jesse Bishop, had witnesses testify on
their behalf in clemency proceedings without their consent. Note, supra note 222, at 893 n. 16. Jesse
Bishop withdrew his appeals, but voluntarily appeared before the Nevada Pardons Board. Lenhard
v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 810 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Bishop told the Board that he would
accept commutation, id., in a way which "reveal[ed] that he considers it undignified to ask for
mercy." Id. at 811 n.2. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Board, in a 5-2 vote, declined to commute
Bishop's sentence when he had so off-handedly requested commutation. Id. at 810.
Since Gregg, several death-sentenced inmates have asked the Court not to interfere with their
executions, or permit others to do so; these inmates wanted to commit what Justice Marshall termed
'"state-administered suicide." Id. at 815. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court has acceeded to three
such requests. See Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725 (1980); Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807 (1979);
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
302 This request was perhaps necessary in view of Potts' expressed willingness to die. The
Board may have been trying to circumvent Georgia's archaic law on insanity on death row. Georgia
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neither present nor represented. A few days later the Board denied clem-
ency. In its opinion, the Board described the kidnapping and murder as
"horrible and inhuman," and noted Potts' efforts to conceal the crime.
The Board rejected the contention that Potts was not mentally responsi-
ble at the time of the two offenses.30 3
The Board handled the four most recent clemency applications in
Georgia 31 under its new procedures, 30 5 and denied them without a hear-
ing in less than a week.306 In three cases, the state quickly executed the
defendant after the Board denied clemency.30 7 In the other, the United
States Supreme Court granted a last-minute stay based on questions the
defendant raised about racial discrimination in application of the death
penalty in Georgia. 308 The Court lifted the stay, without explanation, a
year later and the defendant was promptly executed.30 9
John Eldon Smith310 and his wife Rebecca Akins Smith were con-
victed and sentenced to death for the killing of Mrs. Smith's former hus-
band and his new bride. A desire to obtain insurance proceeds, as well as
Smith's desire to impress the Mafia as a "hit man," apparently motivated
the couple to commit the murder. John Maree provided key testimony
law provides today, as it did in 1903, that "No person ... convicted of a capital offense shall be
entitled to any inquisition or trial to determine his sanity." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2601 (1983). Only
the Governor may, at his discretion, initiate an inquiry; he also makes the ultimate determination of
sanity after receiving the report of the examining committee. Id. § 27-2602. In Solesbee v. Balkcom,
339 U.S. 9 (1950), the Court upheld the constitutionality of these provisions. Id. at 13. These
statutes have also survived more recent challenges. See McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp.
408, 429-30 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 721 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc); McCorquodale v.
Stynchcombe, 239 Ga. 138, 143-45, 236 S.E.2d 486, 489-90, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977);
"Neither legal nor medical insanity is a standard for commutation of capital cases in Georgia."
Note, supra note 224, at 170.
303. Potts Clemency Opinion, supra note 300.
304. Applications of John Eldon Smith, Alpha Otis Stephens, Iyon Ray Stanley and Roosevelt
Green. See infra notes 307-24 and accompanying text.
305. Amended Rules, supra note 243.
306. Telephone conversations with L. Silas Moore, supra note 239 and George Kendall, supra
note 277.
307. John Eldon Smith, put to death on Dec. 15, 1983, was the first person executed in Georgia
since 1964. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1983, at A23, col. 1. Ivon Ray Stanley was executed on July 12,
1984 and Roosevelt Green was executed on January 9, 1985. See supra note 277.
308. On Dec. 13, 1983, nine hours before his scheduled execution, the United States Supreme
Court, divided 5 to 4, granted a stay of execution to Alpha Otis Stephens. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,
1983, at A25, col. 1.
309. Alpha Otis Stephens was executed in Georgia's electric chair on December 12, 1984. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1984 at A18, cols. 1-5.
310. Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 222
S.E.2d 308 (1976).
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by stating that he had agreed to help the Smiths carry out the planned
homicides for $1,000. Maree and Smith, who both lived in North Miami
Beach, Florida, drove to Macon, Georgia and lured the Akinses to a se-
cluded area. Maree testified3 1 that Smith shot the couple at close range
with his rifle; the two men then drove back to Florida. Both Smith and
his wife were sentenced to death, based on the aggravating circumstance
that they committed the murders for the purpose of receiving money.31a
While John Smith's collateral attacks on his conviction and sentence
were still pending,3" 3 and before Smith applied for clemency, the Georgia
Board of Pardons and Paroles conducted its clemency investigation. In
1982, the Board, through the chief parole officer in the district of convic-
tion, interviewed Smith, his codefendants, other witnesses, and court offi-
cials." 4 The Board placed a 32 page report summarizing the findings of
this investigation in Smith's file.
On December 7, 1983, the Board received Smith's application for
clemency. The 50 page application requested a 90 day stay of execution,
a public hearing, and commutation of the death sentence. The five Board
members reviewed the application in light of the previously filed report
and sent a letter to the Board Chairman with their decision. The consen-
sus of the Board was that the facts did not warrant a delay in the execu-
tion. The Board did not hold a hearing, nor request a stay of the
execution, and on December 13, 1983 it issued an order denying the ap-
plication for consideration of commutation of Smith's death sentence.315
311. Maree swore that the prosecutor had not promised any leniency in exchange for his testi-
mony, It developed later that his testimony was false. District Attorney Fred Hasty submitted an
affidavit stating that he promised Maree a life sentence if he testified, and assured Maree that he
would seek the death penalty against him as well if he failed to testify. Smith v. Zant, 250 Ga. 645,
650, 301 S.E.2d 32, 36 (1983).
312. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(4) (1983).
313 Smith challenged his conviction and sentence in both state and federal courts on the
grounds that the trial court unconstitutionally excluded women from his jury, that the prosecution
introduced evidence in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments, and that Georgia was applying
the death penalty in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion. Smith v. Zant, 250 Ga. 645, 646, 301
S.E.2d 32, 33 (1983); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 584-85 (5th Cir. 1981), modifiedon reh'g, 671
F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Zant, 250 Ga. 645, 646, 301 S.E.2d 32, 33 (1983). The challenge
involving the underrepresentation of women on Georgia juries saved the life of Smith's wife and
coconspirator. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127
(1983). A racial discrimination challenge spared, but only for a year, Alpha Otis Stephens. See
supra note 308-9 and accompanying text.
314, Conversations with L. Silas Moore, supra note 239.
315. Order, State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Denial of Application for Consideration of
Commutation of Death Sentence: John Eldon Smith (December 13, 1983). (The Board's one-page
order is on file with the author.)
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Georgia executed Smith two days later.3 16
The Board denied Alpha Otis Stephens' clemency application on the
same day as it denied Smith's. 317 The Board took even less time summa-
rily to deny Stephens' application. The Board received the application
on Saturday, December 10 and denied it on Tuesday, December 13.3 t8
The United States Supreme Court granted Stephens a stay of execution
later that same day.319
Stephens 32° was convicted of murdering Roy Asbell, who surprised
Stephens and an accomplice while they were burglarizing the home of
Asbell's son.32' According to Stephens' statement to the police, Asbell
said "What are you niggers doing in my house?" and pulled his gun.
Stephens and his accomplice hit Asbell and knocked him unconscious.
They then drove him to a nearby pasture and shot him when Asbell tried
to run away. Stephens testified at the penalty phase that his accomplice
had actually done the killing; he also testified that he was sorry for what
he had done and that both men had been very high on drugs.322
The Board of Pardons and Paroles ordered an investigation of Ste-
phens in the summer of 1983, after the United States Supreme Court
reinstated his death sentence.323 The Board interviewed the inmate by
use of a questionnaire; the last question on the form provided the inmate
an opportunity to tell his side of the story. Again the Board placed the
report of the investigation in Stephens' file. When Stephens' attorney
sent the Board Stephens' clemency application, the Board compared the
application with the investigative report. As with Smith, the Board de-
316. See supra note 307. The United States Supreme Court denied Smith's stay application by a
vote of 6 to 3. 52 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S., 12/14/83).
317. Order, State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Denial of Application for Consideration of
Commutation of Death Sentence: Alpha Otis Stephens (Dec. 13, 1983). See also New York Times,
Dec. 14, 1983, at A25, col. 1.
318. Telephone conversations with L. Silas Moore, supra note 239.
319. Stephens v. Kemp, 104 S. Ct. 562 (1984), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 1263 (1984). See supra note
309 and accompanying text.
320. The United States Supreme Court had already heard Stephens' case on other issues. See
supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
321. The following facts are taken from Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 227 S.E.2d 261 (1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976).
322. Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2736 (1983).
323. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had reversed Stephens' death sentence on the
ground that the jury's finding of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance undermined the va-
lidity of the sentence. Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980). The United States Supreme
Court reinstated Stephens' death sentence. Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983). See supra notes
46-54 and accompanying text.
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cided that the facts did not warrant a further delay of the execution. It
denied a stay and refused to grant a hearing. In a one-page order the
Board denied the application for consideration of commutation and
stated that "there are insufficient grounds for further consideration of the
application., 3 2
4
Although the small number of applications for clemency makes pre-
dicting the Board's future treatment of applications speculative, it is pos-
sible to make some observations about the treatment the Board accorded
these seven men. The Board's involvement was considerable in the three
earlier clemency applications; in one case it actually granted clemency.
The courts' comparatively cursory review of the death sentences in those
cases probably triggered the Board's active involvement. In each of these
three cases, the state was ready to execute the defendant after astonish-
ingly little judicial review. The inmate did not know, until a few days
before his scheduled execution, whether the Board would consider clem-
ency. The Board did fully consider all three applications. In its consid-
eration of these applications, the Board undertook tasks that the
judiciary should have accomplished. In Hill's case, the Board modified a
plainly excessive sentence; this modification was clearly the responsibility
of the Georgia Supreme Court. In Dix and Potts, the Board more care-
fully considered the defendant's mental state in mitigation of the sen-
tence, rather than solely in exculpation, as the judiciary had done.
If these three inmates had pursued collateral attacks on their
sentences, the Board might well have treated their cases differently. At-
torneys filed the four recent applications after exhausting full collateral
review of the defendants' death sentences in both state and federal courts,
in accordance with the Board's new procedures. The Board handled
these recent applications in a much more superficial fashion. Indeed, the
Board appears to have changed its view of its function considerably. Be-
cause the courts, upon habeas corpus petitions, are performing the task
of reversing many death sentences in cases that do not seem to warrant
the extreme penalty,325 the Board of Pardons and Paroles may have de-
cided that commutation of a death sentence should be a rarity.
Whether or not the Board has changed its view of its role in the capital
punishment process, the Georgia experience does not justify the conclu-
sion that the clemency board will eliminate whatever arbitrariness re-
324. Stephens Order, supra note 317.
325 Courts have set aside death sentences in a very high proportion of cases. See supra note 163
and accompanying text.
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mains in the judicial system that selects defendants for death row. While
the Board commuted Hill's death sentence, it upheld Stephens' sentence
in three days and without a hearing, even though the penalty may have
resulted from racial discrimination. Where the defendant has unsuccess-
fully exhausted all available forms of direct and collateral relief, the
Board seems to find it difficult to believe that judicial process made either
a mistake in fact or a significant procedural error. The Board will rarely
request a stay of execution, because the clemency application and the
secret investigative report are not likely to raise important questions that
a jury or federal judge have not already addressed. The Board is simply
likely to deny applications for capital clemency. If this is true, the
Board's role in the Georgia capital punishment system will become
vestigial.
The clemency authority certainly has the power to avoid blatant injus-
tice; it can also perpetuate or contribute to it. By its very nature, the
clemency authority is ill-suited to the job of eliminating the arbitrary
results of a system that is fundamentally discretionary. Even with its
best efforts, the Board can not do much to correct the failure of Georgia
to meet the requirement that "capital punishment be imposed fairly, and
with reasonable consistency, or not at all." 326
CONCLUSION
Examination of the results produced by the Georgia capital punish-
ment system several years after the post-Furman statute went into effect
leads to the conclusion that the new law has failed to bring about fair and
evenhanded imposition of death sentences. The safeguards that the
Gregg plurality relied on to avoid discriminatory and freakish application
of the penalty have not performed that function. The broad, unreview-
able discretion of prosecutors, deemed either not significant for eighth
amendment purposes or assumed to be exercised properly by the Justices
in Gregg, contributes immeasurably to the risk of arbitrary or discrimina-
tory imposition of death sentences. Moreover, the unfettered discretion
of the executive branch to grant or deny clemency adds the potential for
further inequities.
Proponents of capital punishment may assert that the system, while
not perfect, has limited discrimination and arbitrariness. This study has
shown, however, that even a system as carefully calibrated as the one
326. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
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enacted in Georgia is unequal to the task of selecting murderers for the
extreme penalty who can be distinguished in a rational and objective way
from other murderers who are either not charged with a capital crime or
not sentenced to death. Proponents may respond to these findings by
justifying capital punishment because of the claimed societal benefits of
imposing death sentences on at least some murderers. The answer to
that argument inherently involves basic value judgments. This author
concludes that if society cannot impose death sentences in a fair, nondis-
criminatory, nonarbitrary manner, it should abandon the effort.
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